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In the context of the ongoing memory and history war between Ukraine, Russia and the West, 
and the increased politicization of history displayed in museums, this thesis seeks to identify 
and analyze national narratives of the Holodomor in feature films, documentaries, monuments, 
and museums. The historical event of the Holodomor, which is called an artificial or man-made 
famine, occurred in Soviet Ukraine during the years of 1932–33. There is currently a debate 
concerning intentionality, number of direct deaths due to hunger and the role of the perpetrators 
where various numbers of dead range from 3.9 million to 10 million. The study itself can be 
characterized as part of Eastern-European Memory Studies and applies theories by Alexander 
Etkind, James E. Young, Astrid Erll and Aleida and Jan Assmann among others. 
The thesis also includes the analysis of debates on the Internet concerning fascist aspects 
of the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) and UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), 
which allegedly collaborated with the Nazis in the massacre of Jews and Poles during the 
occupation of Ukraine in the Second World War. The narratives of the Holodomor and that of 
nationalist war criminality during the Second World War seems to be clashing. When one 
narrative is brought into use in for example film, the other is used to delegitimize and to some 
extent demonize the group deploying it. 
Some of the findings show that the narratives employed in the film Bitter Harvest and 
the documentary Harvest of Despair are of nationalistic character and fronts the iconic number 
of 7–10 million. We see that the filmic depictions, and to some extent, the Holodomor Museum 
in Kiev are all set in an antagonistic mode of remembering, demonizing the Russian other and 
describing the famine as genocide against the Ukrainian people. Other findings worth noting is 
that of the recontextualizing of images from the 1921–22 Russian famine in Harvest of Despair. 
These images of famine victims, mostly children, are used as evidence for the Holodomor of 
1932–33. 
Further analysis of the Holodomor memorial complex shows that it is a modern and 
visually rich experience and that its online presence is up to date. Especially the virtual tour 
enables visitors from all over the world to experience the museum. Transnational monuments 
in North America are closely connected to the complex in Kiev and the pluri-medial context of 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
“This provocative outcry about genocide ... has been elevated to the top government level in contemporary 
Ukraine. Does this mean that they have even outdone the Bolshevik propaganda mongers with their rakish 
juggling?” Solzhenitsyn1 asked. 
He added that “western people” - unlike Russians - had had little exposure to “monstrous lies”, and were 
therefore more willing to believe historical errors. “They have never really got into our history. All they 
need is a loony fable,” he wrote. (Harding 2008) 
 
The above citations originate from an article published in The Guardian in 2008 by Luke 
Harding, which includes comments2 from the famous Soviet dissident, novelist, and historian 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn on George W. Bush attendance in 2008 to a commemoration in Kiev 
of the victims of the Holodomor.3 This context and Solzhenitsyn’s statements will serve as an 
entry point and prism for this study as it perfectly captures one side of the debate on whether 
the famine constitutes genocide or not. More importantly, it illustrates how the words of an 
authority can be instrumentalized to shape public views of historical events. However, my main 
task will not be to ponder the question of genocide in relation to the famine, but instead look at 
its constructed images in various media. Furthermore, I look at the construction of the fascist 
image of western Ukraine in memory narratives because this image can be seen as the negative 
to that of the image of Ukrainians as victims of a “hidden Holocaust.” The image as victims of 
foreign state terror and the mirror image as Nazi collaborators are important tools in what can 
be termed as a memory war between Ukraine and Russia that has only escalated since the 
Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine in 2014. Since the Orange Revolution the Holodomor 
narrative has been reconstructed in museums, monuments and even in a western film 
production. While Russia has been producing many big-budget films depicting the glorious 
battles and sacrifices in the Second World War in the last decade, we now see Ukrainian 
national film production starting to pump out their own depictions of their national heroes and 
even more importantly that of the nation’s victimhood. 
                                                 
1 A short note on transliteration of Russian and Ukrainain names: I have used the more simplified version of the 
names. For example, Plokhy instead of Plokhii. 
2  The original article by Solzhenitsyn is titled ‘Swallowing Shameless Lies’ and found at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/apr/03/swallowingshamelesslies 
3 The Holodomor was a famine that struck Ukrainian SSR and other parts of the Soviet Union during the years of 




THEME AND BACKGROUND 
This study has emerged from my interest in Ukrainian and Russian memory and history, more 
specifically from my reflections on historical works on the Holodomor and the current crisis 
and conflict in Ukraine, which involves the Russian Federation and the West (North America 
and EU) in a geopolitical struggle. This study could be defined as entrenched in the eastern-
European branch of memory studies,4 though from a western media perspective. 
 
As I began to develop my thesis I possessed limited knowledge of those topics but the deeper I 
immersed myself in them, the more complex and confusing it all became (and of course all the 
more intriguing). Upon first learning about the Holodomor back in 2009 through the memoir 
Execution by Hunger: The Hidden Holocaust by famine survivor Miron Dolot from 1985, it 
baffled me that such a cataclysmic event could be so unknown in our part of the world. It scared 
me that it was possible to cover up this staggering amount of dead for such a long period of 
time. Then on the other hand the faint possibility that this was a mad fairytale invented by an 
Ukrainian propaganda machine equally disturbed me. Indeed, the identification of the existence 
of a Ukrainian propaganda machine by Solzhenitsyn in the Guardian article was compelling. 
Usually when you hear the word “propaganda” you immediately connect it with Nazi Empire 
or the Soviet Union/Russia. What exactly makes the Ukrainian version different from the 
Russian, one might ask? Why would they need propaganda anyway, aren’t they de-
communizing their nation to tear away from their Soviet and Russified past? These are surely 
difficult questions to answer. Solzhenitsyn then lead me further into confusion when I 
coincidentally stumbled upon another quotation by him, this time inside the dust jacket of 
historian Robert Conquest’s book Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-
Famine from 1986: 
 
                                                 
4 Professor of History and Europe-Russia relations Alexander Etkind seems to be at the forefront concerning 
eastern-European memory studies. The Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society founded and edited 




“Conquest’s excellently and professionally written book The Harvest of Sorrow investigates the most 
serious, although up to now least researched…crime of Leninist-Stalinist communism: its war against the 
peasantry of the U.S.S.R. which, before its destruction, constituted 82 percent of the entire population.”  
 
Apparently back in 1986 Solzhenitsyn did not call what Conquest termed a “terror-famine” a 
“loony fable”. Earlier on I had questioned myself what the former Soviet dissident and Gulag-
author had said about the Holodomor and I naively assumed that he would condemn it to the 
same level as other Stalinist crimes. While he did so in 1986, twenty years later his views had 
seemingly changed in favor of Putin’s government. Or had they really? It is worth notifying 
that his harsh comments in The Guardian on the Holodomor where made with regards to a 
state-initiated commemoration, and not the more objective historical work of someone like 
Conquest. Even Conquest’s work has been heavily criticized for relying too much on rumors, 
hearsay, and dubious witness testimonies. What then is the difference between the two 
narratives that made Solzhenitsyn spit vitriol for a global public and who do they belong to? 
Part of this thesis’s goal is to illuminate exactly this. After reading more on the topic of 
Solzhenitsyn’s vast work through reception and memory studies, in Elisa Kriza’s illuminating 
doctoral work Alexander Solzhenitsyn: Cold War Icon, Gulag Author, Russian Nationalist? 
from 2014, my insight increased on the current Russian view on past Soviet crimes, like the 
controversial artificial famine in Ukraine. I then understood that to use Solzhenitsyn’s work and 
views as a prism for understanding todays political climate would prove to be very fruitful. 
 
Political and historical background 
The contemporary political background for this study involves the two recent revolutions in 
Ukraine, the first one in 2004, named the Orange Revolution, and the second in 2014, the so-
called Maidan Revolution. The latter eventually lead to escalated public outpouring of anger 
and frustration with the corrupt oligarch and pro-Russian leadership and culminated in a divided 
Ukraine with the west and center part waging war against the eastern part.  Most relevant for 
this thesis is the violence against Soviet monuments of historic personas like Lenin, entitled 
Leninfall by Russian-American historian Serhii Plokhy (2017) and the construction of a 
Holodomor museum and monuments. Volodymyr Ihschenko (2011), a senior lecturer on 
sociology in Kiev, highlights the anti-Communist politics of Yuschenko’s presidency and 
points to two main strategies employed in his politics of memory and following “war of 
memorials:” Victimization, linked to the emphasis on the Holodomor and the glorification of 
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interwar Ukrainian nationalist “freedom-fighters,” who fought the Nazis on side and the Soviets 
on the other. These memory politics are part of what lead up to the revolution in 2014.  This 
finally resulted in the controversial departure of President Viktor Yanukovych and was due to 
his policy in conjunction with Russia’s leader Putin of trying to move Ukraine closer to Russia’s 
influence, instead of signing an association agreement with the EU (Plokhy 2017). This was in 
stark contrast with some part of the Ukrainian peoples wishes and hopes for a better future by 
becoming integrated in the European Union. Divided as independent Ukraine ultimately did 
become, the western part and the center of the nation mostly stands for pro-EU and western 
ideals, while the eastern part feels strongly linked to Russia, and the most extreme view is to 
eventually secede from Ukraine and become part of Russia, or Novorosiia, which according to 
Ukrainian writer Yuri Scherbak can be described as: 
 
…a fictitious pseudo-state formation that has never existed, for the purpose of slicing the largest and most 
developed eight (sic!) oblasts from Ukraine. Capturing and annexing these oblasts under the banner of 
“Russkii miir” (the Russian World) would cut Ukraine off from the Black and Azov Seas, transforming it 
into a marginal non-viable stump of a former developed country. (Scherbak (2016:72) 
 
The ideologically loaded rhetoric of Novorosiia then seems to be an invention of the Kremlin 
apparatus with roots in Russia’s imperial past with the goal of reclaiming former parts of the 
empire, perfectly exemplified by the annexation of Crimea with the invasion of “the green little 
men” being soldiers allegedly from Russia, but not wearing any insignia on their uniforms. The 
Russian government and elite has long claimed that Crimea historically belonged to Russia, but 
one the methods used to take it back was to apply a highly aggressive propaganda and 
disinformation campaign (here we hear talk of “the black little men”): 
 
From day one of the conflict, Russia employed the poisonous weapon of mass disinformation, announcing 
that “the Ukrainian Nazis and banderites” who took power in Kyiv with the aid of the US and NATO 
allegedly wanted to destroy the Russian-speaking population of the Donbas, to forcibly Ukrainize this 
region, transforming the “glorious Russian Donbas land” into a field of bloody crimes. Rhetorically and 
methodologically this was typical Goebbels-like propaganda, extensively used during the Communist 
time, a popular appeal that employed the same old stereotypes, which targeted the Ukrainian national 





 While there might be some elements of truth in such conspiracy theories like that of the US 
and NATO installing Nazi and fascists to power in Kyiv, it arguably says more about the 
contemporary politics and mindsets in Russia, though of course not just there, Russian 
propaganda easily spreads this narrative to the West, where it is read and believed uncritically 
as well. Part of the reason why Russia acts in this aggressive way is the belief that it is 
surrounded by enemies who wishes to destroy its nation, and if you mix in a Nazi threat and the 
crucifixion of babies5 you are henceforth allowed to do anything in self-defense. Here we see 
the use of a propaganda style stemming from the First World War where German soldiers were 
reported to have impaled children on their bayonets, cutting their hands off and even eating 
them.6 This kind of fabricated horror stories were used to demonize the enemy, enrage the 
public and stir up lust for war. In the quotation above we saw Sherbak compare the Russian 
disinformation campaign to “Goebbels-like propaganda”. In this manner Sherbak himself draws 
parallels between Russia and Nazi Germany, the point here is not that of Sherbak being right 
or not, but to illustrate the act of linking contemporary people or groups to criminal pasts. It is 
perhaps possible that these types of acts may divert attention from the real ongoing 
humanitarian catastrophe in eastern Ukraine, with 10 090 people killed and about 23 966 injured 
from April 2014 until May 2017, as reported by the UN.7 The same report tells that about 1.6 
million people has lost or fled their homes, crucial infrastructure damaged, not to forget the 
financial crisis making a hard life for normal people even harder. Also consider all the citizens, 
both young and middle aged, from both sides sent to fight and die against their fellow 
countrymen. These facts all gets a bit drowned out in the media hysterics speaking of fascists 
and Nazis from the past coming to eat your babies. 
 
We may state that the past surely still is alive in the present, which takes us to the historical 
background of the Holodomor. While the famine that occurred in Soviet Ukraine is known as 
the Holodomor it is known in other terms such as killer famine or terror-famine as used by 
Robert Conquest in 1986 or more recently the term red famine can be found in the title of the 
                                                 
5 During the war in the Donbas (eastern Ukraine) region in 2014 the Russian state news channel “Channel One” 
reported on Ukrainian soldiers crucifying and executing a little boy to a wooden board in front of his mother’s 
eyes. See for example an article on this in The Washington Post at:  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/04/08/russian-media-fabricated-story-about-a-
child-getting-killed-by-ukrainian-shelling-the-bbc-says/?utm_term=.e0ca72d37ba3 
6 Political writer and activist Arthur Ponsonby wrote about such lies used by British propagandists in his book 
Falsehood in War-time : Containing an Assortment of Lies Circulated throughout the Nations during the Great 
War from 1928. 




new book by historian Anne Applebaum from 2017.8 The famine itself took place in the years 
of 1932 to 1933 when millions of people allegedly died. What is crucial to understand about 
the Holodomor are its complex causes. It has repeatedly been attributed the term “man-made 
famine”, which points to its artificial nature. If it indeed was man-made is debated to this day. 
To get a well-informed overview one could for example read history professor Hiroaki 
Kuromiya’s article The Soviet Famine of 1932–1933 Reconsidered from 2008. In it he looks at 
intentionality; was the famine deliberately created to starve millions in the Soviet Union 
opposed to collectivization? The other aspect looked at is ethnicity; was the famine directed 
solely at Ukrainians? Some of the sources laid out by Kuromiya is a book by historians of Soviet 
Agriculture R. W. Davies and S. G. Wheatcroft, who in unison wrote the book The Years of 
Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931–1933 in 2004. Their book apparently stirred up debates on 
the journal Europe-Asia Studies between said historians and historian Mark B. Tauger and 
economics professor Michael Ellmann. Kuromiya shows how Tauger has estimated that the 
crops of 1932 were exceptionally small, then he interferes to say that Taugers findings:” …does 
not preclude the man-made nature of the Great Famine: if the Soviet government had been 
willing to accept external aid or shifted trade priority, the famine could have been averted or 
would have been much more limited in nature.” (Kuromiya 2008:663) This and other examples 
is given to illustrate what could have causes the famine and if there exists evidence of a 
premeditated plan of Stalin to inflict hunger and starvation on the Soviet Union. In his 
conclusion, Kuromiya writes: 
 
Although Stalin intentionally let starving people die, it is unlikely that he intentionally caused the famine 
to kill millions of people. It is also unlikely that Stalin used famine as a cheap alternative to deportation. 
True, the famine affected Ukraine severely; true, too, that Stalin distrusted the Ukrainian peasants and 
Ukrainian nationalists. Yet not enough evidence exists to show that Stalin engineered the famine to punish 
specifically the ethnic Ukrainians. The famine did not take place in an international political vacuum. The 
sharp rise in the foreign threat was likely to have been an important aggravating factor. (Kuromiva 
2008:673–674) 
 
Kuromiya’s conclusion needs to be considered in my study as it shows that scholarly research 
cannot show to any definitive evidence of a plan to execute millions of people by starvation. 
While the aspects of intentionality and ethnicity are of significance, the demographic research 
                                                 
8 The full title is Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine. 
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and the varying death toll numbers plays an important factor. In fact, the numbers of dead due 
to starvation and the question of genocide is still a source of controversy todayin both the mass 
media and in scholarly literature. 9 This point is aptly illustrated by historian David R. Maples 
in his book Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine from 
2007. Denial of genocides is as we see not restricted to the Holocaust, though questioning the 
death-toll number of the Holodomor does not necessarily amount to absolute denial. Imagine if 
the current German government would deny and deny that 6 million was murdered during the 
Holocaust and question that the Jews as a race were singled out for extermination, there would 
undoubtedly be a great outcry and scandal. This is still not the case with denial of the 
Holodomor as that has been the attitude of Russia towards Ukraine since the famine culminated 
in millions of dead until today, and this has not stirred up great international uproars anywhere. 
To be fair, the contemporary Russian government or any serious historian do not deny that the 
famine ever took place in the Ukrainian USSR. But to some extent, denial of the Holodomor of 
1932–1933 as an artificial famine directed specifically at the Ukrainian peasantry (or Ukrainian 
people) is still dominating Russian politics and is according to Marples (2017) the dominating 
view in North American academia. As of today, there is still no consensus on these numbers or 
on the genocide question. To further complicate the issue, the Holodomor is an event that is 
often likened to the Holocaust in its inhumanity and death toll but is at the same time overlooked 
in comparison and was denied by Soviet authorities from its occurrence until the late stages of 
glasnost (Sysyn 2015:8). In contrast to this, I discovered that education on the Holocaust is 
lacking in Ukraine, as shown by Swedish historian Johan Dietsch,10 presumably because too 
much focus on such an iconic and sacred evil in Ukraine would minimize the evil of Holodomor. 
The thesis will take this point into consideration together with the downplaying of Ukrainian 
nationalist’s involvement in Jewish massacres in Ukraine during the Second World War.11 Here 
we perhaps arrive at the core of what can best be described as a memory war between Russia 
and Ukraine, which includes the rehabilitation of war criminals on both sides and on many 
discursive levels (monumental, political, filmic, mass media).  
 
                                                 
9 See for example Kulchytsky’s articles on this subject available at https://day.kyiv.ua/en/article/topic-day/how-
west-interprets-ukrainian-holodomor and https://day.kyiv.ua/en/article/topic-day/how-west-interprets-ukrainian-
holodomor-2 
10 See examples of this in his article on the historiography of the Holodomor ‘Struggling with a “Nuremberg 
Historiography” of the Holodomor.’ 
11 See Cohen’s article ‘The Historian Whitewashing Ukraine’s Past' for a critical look on Viatrovych and the 
Ukrainian Institute of National Memory. 
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To understand how and why the famine happened is without doubt a difficult historical inquiry 
and is not within the purview of the present study, still, I think it is important to have some 
basic knowledge on the topic. When you look at the sheer number of articles and books, ranging 
from scientific works to articles in newspapers and webzines on the Holodomor, you understand 
that it is a complex event studied from many different angles. On the amount of work done on 
the Holodomor and on the question of genocide the Ukrainian historian Stanislav Kulchytsky 
has written the following: 
 
The number of publications on the Ukrainian Holodomor is more than 20,000. It is one of the most researched 
subjects in the world historiography. Have the researchers convinced the public that the Holodomor was 
genocide? The findings the US Congress Commission on the Ukraine Famine made in 1988 say that it was 
genocide. However, the US government does not officially confirm this due to the position of the Russian 
Federation, which rejects this qualification of the famine. In November 2006 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 
declared the Holodomor as an act of genocide. Yet the UN General Assembly does not recognize this. 
(Kulchytsky 2015, not paginated) 
 
I presume one can never come to a final conclusion on the subject unless we discover how to 
travel back in time and see with our own eyes what really happened. Until then, we can only 
study the reconstructions of the past by historians and other scholars using available data from 
archives and the data from the minds (memories) of witnesses. And here is the rub; historians 
who mainly uses demographic data to reconstruct the Holodomor event seems to differ in their 
conclusions with those who mainly rely on witness testimonials as source. I shall return to this 
point later in the text. Meanwhile we can say that the form of the historical monograph is the 
most recognized scientific way to reconstruct the past in a coherent narrative which then can be 
read and interpreted by an audience. But there are other and perhaps more powerful and 
imaginative ways of doing this and that is through fictional literature or film. Thus, on this 
historical and political background my initial aim is to study how the cultural and collective 
memory of the Holodomor is constructed through film, museums, monuments, and literature 
since the Maidan Revolution of 2014 (also known as the Revolution of Dignity), and in addition 
the transnational connection found in the monuments in North America (Canada and USA). 
Iconography in film and photographs, monuments and museums, webpages and literature are 




THESIS, SCOPE, METHOD AND STRUCTURE 
Together with the inquires mentioned above I have as main question of this thesis how the tragic 
event Holodomor is constructed as a counter memory or counter monument to the iconic and 
hegemonic memory of the Holocaust. Therefore, narrative is at the core of this study. At a later 
stage in my study, while analyzing the film Bitter Harvest (Mendeluk 2017), a second question 
crystalized: What are similarities between mediated versions of the Holocaust and the 
Holodomor? Are we perhaps witnessing a form of iconoclash at work in the cultural memory 
space? Iconoclash is a term introduced by sociologist Bruno Latour in 2002 and is tied to an 
exhibition by the same name, with the intent to complicate the term iconoclasm. Iconoclasm is 
the conscious decision of destroying idols, monuments or icons and Latour (2002:16) thus 
defines iconoclash via iconoclasm:  
 
Iconoclasm is when we know what is happening in the act of breaking and what the motivations for what 
appears as a clear project of destruction are; iconoclash, on the other hand, is when one does not know, 
one hesitates, one is troubled by an action for which there is no way to know, without further enquiry, 
whether it is destructive or constructive. (Latour 2002:16) 
 
Latour’s term is intriguing and offers new ways to think about symbolic violence. In my case 
the deconstruction of Lenin monuments in Ukraine would be interesting to look at from that 
angle. However, the main focus of this analysis will be on sites of memory of the Holodomor, 
including cultural, transnational, and counter monuments. The term les lieux de mémoire 
originates from Pierre Nora. I will not use the term sites of memory in the exact sense that Pierre 
Nora thinks of these sites. Instead I think it is more fruitful to apply Professor Alexander Etkind 
theories. Etkind studies monuments and memories of Soviet state terror and has an interesting 
new theoretical perspective for studying monuments that is more in line with our information 
age: 
 
Monuments are inconspicuous if people are not talking and writing about them; mourning rites are 
incomplete if they do not crystallize in monuments. The interaction between texts and monuments makes 
the core of cultural memory, but this interaction has not been adequately explored in memory studies. 
(Etkind 2013:177, my emphasis) 
 
Prompted by Etkind theory, I set out to explore the interaction between texts (soft cultural 
memory) and monuments (hard cultural memory). In this context I will include mediated 
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versions of the past such as film and view them as potential sites of memory. I propose to think 
of filmic representations of the past as celluloid monuments, this is inspired in some part by 
Etkind’s distinction and interaction between soft and hard cultural memory (a more detailed 
description of my own theorizing is found in chapter 2). Professor James E. Young’s definitions 
of counter-memorials are also taken into consideration as they seem to be applicable to the 
Holodomor memorial complex.  Furthermore, I apply Astrid Erll’s concept of pluri-medial 
networks (Erll 2010) to better illuminate the Holodomor narratives and modes of remembering 
in different media. For a critical discussion of memory study theories, I will take memory 
scholar Dagmar Brunow’s (2015) discussion of transnational memories and the notion of the 
iconic turn into consideration. Prominent memory theorists Jan and Aleida Assmans theories 
of cultural and collective memories will of course be considered and Aleida Assmanns theory 
of global memory and icons as they are relevant when considering the global memory wars.  
All these theories, terms and their applications will be further explained and discussed in 
chapter two. 
 
I must necessarily take the western viewpoint since that is where I have spent most of my life. 
This choice of view is also due to language restrictions and because a considerable amount of 
research and memory work and memory making on the famine was and is still being done by 
western scholars12 and recently by film producers as well. To try to counterbalance this, I have 
used work done by Ukrainian and Russian scholars writing in English and other translated 
Russian and Ukrainian sources such as newspapers, webzines, and videos. Another important 
restrictions to this study is that I have not visited one of the main analytical objects, which is a 
museum located in Ukraine. Therefore, I’m restricted to analyzing information found on the 
Internet and virtual tour videos of the museum. A final note on this is the fact that my wife is 
from western Ukraine and that this fact may have an impact on my view of the topic, though I 
strive to uphold objectivity as an ideal, but I realize that this is much harder to achieve in reality. 
 
                                                 
12  See for example Anne Applebaum Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine from 2017; Timothy Snyder 
Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin from 2010; Robert Conquest The 




When it comes down to objects for analysis I will partly focus on semi-historical documentaries 
on the Holodomor produced by people from the Ukrainian diaspora 13  in Canada. The 
documentary I shall mainly focus on is Harvest of Despair from 1984, but I will briefly look at 
the newer documentary Genocide Revealed from 2009, but then through a secondary source 
since I have not yet watched it myself. Reception and discussion of these films is scarce, and 
the latter film doesn’t even have an IMDb entry, is not to be found on any streaming services 
or YouTube and the only way to get it is to order it from the producer’s own webpage. It is 
strange that there exists no online version of the documentary considering the aim of the 
producers is bringing the topic of the famine to a bigger audience. I guess the demand for the 
documentary is not that great and that funding for the project plays a part. Canadian Ukrainians 
produced both films and director Yuri Luhovny was involved in both (he was director for 
Genocide Revealed). The latter documentary features newly shot eyewitness testimonies of 
famine survivors and was shot in Ukraine (which may be used for authenticating the genocide 
claims in a both a political and historical context). Concerning the Harvest of Despair 
documentary, one can find a lot of relevant data for narrative analysis on the webpage of The 
Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Centre (UCRDC). It has a vivid description 
of the Holodomor on their webpage, which begins as follows: 
 
It is called the forgotten holocaust - a time when Stalin was dumping millions of tons of wheat on Western 
markets, while in Ukraine, men, women, and children were dying of starvation at the rate of 25,000 a day, 
17 human beings a minute. Seven to ten million people perished in a famine caused not by war or natural 
disasters, but by ruthless decree.14 
 
This bit of text holds part of one of the Holodomor narratives which will be scrutinized further 
on in this text. The second item for analysis, a Hollywood-styled (though not produced in 
Hollywood) movie named Bitter Harvest was released in 2017 by Canadian director George 
Mendeluk which tells a fictionalized love story with the event of the Holodomor as historical 
background. I have earlier in my studies found that the possible objective of this film could be 
to depict the famine as genocide and ultimately showing Stalin and the Bolshevik leadership as 
evil agents and thereby implying that the current Russian Federation undermines genocidal acts 
                                                 
13 The Ukrainian diaspora consist of émigrés, some with background from the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian 
Nationaists) and the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), that fled to the West (Germany, Canada, USA) after the 
famines and Second World War. Many became part of the academic community of these countries and many seem 
to support the idea of the Holodomor as genocide. See historian Per Rudling’s article ‘Multiculturalism, Memory, 





of the past.15 In effect, this establishes a link to the current crisis in Ukraine. Gong back in time 
we have the earliest film depicting the Holodomor, named Holod-33 and directed by Oles 
Yanchuk, a Ukrainian production from 1991. In 2014, another Ukrainian film tackling the 
Holodomor was released, titled The Guide by Oles Sanin. These films will not be given much 
space in the analysis as they fall outside the time period of this study. Another reason is because 
I strive to focus on films and literature produced in the West. However, brief references will be 
made to them to compare to Bitter Harvest. 
 
In the second and third chapter I will outline the most relevant literature and at the same time 
clarify definitions of the chosen theories and methods. 
 
Chapter three contains the identification and analysis of Holodomor narratives in Bitter Harvest 
and Harvest of Despair and illustrates intertextual connections to famous Holocaust depictions. 
 
The fourth chapter of this text then goes on to the analysis of what I propose to call the 
Holodomor monument complex, which also includes celluloid monuments and illuminates 
interactions between hard and soft cultural memory that are to be found on various locations in 
Ukraine as well as in the West. Narrative theory will be used in the analysis of the complex. In 
this regard, memory scholar Anette Kuhn (2010:298) points out that narrative is of high 
importance when it comes to cultural memory and the telling of memory stories, which is very 
relevant for studying a memorial museum. 
 
In the conclusive chapter I will sum up the analysis of all objects. This is done to identify 
differences or changes in the Holodomor narrative and cultural memory since Ukraine’s Orange 
Revolution of 2004-2005, still with most weight on the time period since the Maidan Revolution 
of Dignity of 2014. And with this in mind we can ask as a concluding question: What kind of 
story or narrative of the Holodomor is told by the Institute of National Memory of Ukraine or 
in the film Bitter Harvest and perhaps even more importantly, whose memories do they display? 
What group do they stem from? 
                                                 
15  15  I did a small-scale analysis of the film Bitter Harvest for a term paper for HIF-3111—Manufacturing 
Monsters: Othering through Constructing Evil in the spring of 2017. On the one hand I looked at the pluri-medial 





Relevance of study 
Most people I ask here in Norway have never heard of the Holodomor, so my hope is that this 
thesis will create increased awareness on the topic, at least in the region of North Norway, 
which borders to the Russian Federation. Furthermore, I believe this study can contribute to the 
understanding of the political conflict in Ukraine on a different level and in addition show how 
the media and memory war operates through different representations not only limited to mass 
media platforms like TV-news, newspapers, and television, but also including documentaries, 
fictional films, and monuments. Perhaps of greatest importance when studying media 
representation of famines is to look away from the past and into the present and try to discern 
what exactly has changed in media reporting on humanitarian disasters. Take for instance the 
current threat of famine looming over the population of Yemen due to a military blockade. Will 
they receive much needed help in time or will they also become new iconic media 
representations of the past long after the event?  Lastly, I believe, as a librarian and information 
worker that the literature referred to herein may be useful to others interested in the topic. I have 
surely benefited from studying the numerous bibliographical lists of journal articles and books. 
While there exist some previous studies from the angle of memory, media, and film studies on 
the Holodomor, they are few and scattered. This takes us to the subject of literature and existing 





Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL MUSINGS 
AND DEFINITIONS 
In this section I shall review and discuss relevant literature and terms connected to the topic of 
my study is starting with definitions of the Holodomor and existing memory work on the 
Holodomor before going on to literature on memory studies. But some clarification on 
geographical issues is first in order. First, when I use the term “the West” I speak of Northern 
America and the European Union. I needed to clarify this since it could be confused with the 
western part of Ukraine. Another important point is that during Soviet times Ukraine did not 
exist as an independent nation state, except for a few years after the Russian revolution 
(Conquest 1986:42). Since then Ukraine did not gain independence until 1991. Of course, this 
detail further complicates the question of genocide as Ukraine was submerged into the Soviet 
Union at the time of the famine. 
 
MEANING AND ETYMOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF THE HOLODOMOR 
I have found that Canadian-American history professor emeritus John-Paul Himka gives a very 
detailed explanation of the term Holodomor in his review article Encumbered Memory: The 
Ukrainian Famine of 1932–33 where he focuses on four historical/memory works on the 
Holodomor. Therein he refers to historian Norman N. Naimark who names it the “Ukrainian 
killer famine” upon which Himka (2013:420) explains:” …is actually an approximate 
translation of holodomor (from holod, famine, and, moryty, kill).” Himka further notes that its 
origins are obscure, that it was coined by a writer named Ivan Drach and appeared in print in 
1988, but then states that the term is older than that. Himka says it is found in the foreword of 
a novel about the famine from 1963 called The Yellow Prince by author Vasyl’ Barka. Then he 
claims he has found evidence that it could be even older still; he says that in 1944 a Ukrainian 
nationalist used the word Holodomor as a pen name while in battle and because of that it may 
have a Western Ukrainian (Galician) origin: 
 
If it is indeed of Galician origin, I surmise that the word “Holodomor” arose under the influence of a 
satirical name for the old Austrian crownland, known in German as Galizien und Lodomerien; wags 
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renamed it Golicja I Glodomeria, which in Polish signifies a place where people go naked and die of 
hunger. (Himka 2013:421) 
 
Adding to this, Himka notes that a testimony from 2007 includes the words of a woman who 
heard it being used by her father at the time of the famine but adds that such testimonies cannot 
always be trusted. Even though its origins go way back Himka notes that it only started to gain 
momentum from 1988 and onwards and that in 2007 it was in use everywhere.  
 
Then we come to the significance of the scope of the Holodomor in its representation as memory 
text in film, monuments, and museum. By scope I’m referring to the aspects of time-periods 
and region that lies within its definition. It’s on this point the term Holodomor often becomes 
unclear and inconsistent. This is due to the occurrence of not just one famine, but three in the 
periods of 1921–22, 1932–33 and 1946–1947,16 which we will see is also manifested at the 
memorial complex in Kiev in the form of engraved text on the central monument on the site. 
 
The images of nakedness and hunger can often be seen in photographs of the Holodomor where 
dead skeletal bodies lie strewn by the roadside to later be carried off by carts to a mass grave. 
The nakedness can also refer to that of being stripped of all material wealth, food, and property, 
which was the fate of the kulaks17 during the collectivization and the following de-kulakization 
in the Soviet Union under Stalin’s rule. This enemy image is of importance in this study as it is 
found in the narrative of the film Bitter Harvest and shall therefore need some further 
elaboration. In short, a kulak was a wealthy farmer which supposedly exploited the poor, for 
instance for work on their farmlands. The kulak was also rumored to be a saboteur of harvest 
machinery and actively undermining the agricultural revolution. They were therefore seen as a 
significant problem during the collectivization and five-year plan of Stalin. The communists in 
power, were then able to transform the term kulak into an elastic enemy image to label anyone 
who refused to join the collective, even though they were in fact utterly poor farmers. In a way 
the destruction of the kulak can be likened to that of the Jews but there were certain important 
differences. Both the Jew and the kulak were looked upon as vermin and treated as such. They 
                                                 
16  See the article ‘Ukraine Suffered Three Terror Famines under the Soviets not just one’ Available at 
http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/11/27/ukrainians-suffered-three-terror-famines-under-the-soviets-not-just-one-
euromaidan-press/  
17See for example Applebaum (2017) or Conquest (1986) for more detailed accounts on collectivization and the 
public enemy image of the kulak in the Soviet Union. 
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were both stripped of property and wealth and often sent to concentration camps (Gulag18 in 
the Soviets Union) or executed on the spot. The main difference lies in that the Jewish people 
were persecuted for their ethnicity while a kulak could be of any race or nationality; the racial 
aspect was not of any great significance. In Stalin’s war on the peasantry the kulaks were 
exterminated as a class, not as a people. If we then move on to the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada 
and the Ukrainian government, whose ultimate goal is to cement the Holodomor of 1932-33 as 
an ethnic genocide of the Ukrainian people, then we can see why they encounter such 
difficulties in this task, especially if they want it recognized as genocide in the eyes of a global 
public. If Stalin’s war on Ukraine was not specifically directed at the Ukrainian people, but at 
the peasantry (or anyone specified as kulaks) as a class, the label of genocide cannot easily be 
applied to the Holodomor since in fact other ethnicities also suffered. This agenda is still 
important for Ukraine and during all the spectacle and political instrumentalization of history 
and memories, the victims who went through hell is still somehow lingering in purgatory. A 
good example of this is seen in an interview of the director of documentary Genocide Revealed 
from 2011 Yurij Luhovy, were he says that many of the famine survivors were reluctant to be 
interviewed because they were afraid of what would happen to them afterwards (Luhovy 
2011:14:49-15:29). In a personal conversation I had with a person from Dnipropetrovsk in 
Ukraine (which was a area severely hit by the famine of 1932–33) who had spoken to a survivor 
that barely ever wanted to communicate memories, the person explained it was just too horrible 
a process to recall the trauma. This illustrates how big a role fear and horror play in the lives of 
famine survivors. They seem to be trapped in a bubble of the past were the perpetrators are still 
in power, ready to silence them if they should communicate their memories. Such witness 
testimonials in documentaries are therefore very important for documenting suppressed 
memories of subaltern genocides and later we shall see other examples of such memories 
struggling to disrupt the level set by the hegemonic Holocaust memories. 
 
UKRAINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND VICTIMIZATION 
A lot has been said and written about memory studies and it is a vast transdisciplinary field 
which includes contributions from political science, media studies, psychology, literary studies, 
and others. Memory is furthermore connected with a wide range of phenomena. In my case the 
                                                 
18 Gulag was a network of labor and concentration camps throughout the Soviet Union. See for instance Anne 
Applebaum’s Gulag: A History (2003) or Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago (1974) for detailed accounts. 
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phenomena under scrutiny are representations of the traumatic event(s) of the Holodomor(s).19  
But what makes memory studies distinctive from history studies? In the intro to the anthology 
Collective Memory Reader Olick and Levy observes that the study of memory is closely linked 
to the Holocaust and the production of films and literature depicting the Holocaust since the 
1970s and the memory boom20 (Olick et al 2011). One aspect that stands out in memory studies 
is the increased focus on visual representations. It also includes the study of memories rendered 
through historical fiction since such forms of memorization arguably has a strong impact on 
our view of past events. The French historian Pierre Nora writing about sites of memory said 
this about the relationship between memory and history: 
 
Memory and history, far from being synonymous, appear now to be in fundamental opposition. Memory 
is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It remains in permanent evolution, open to the 
dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to 
manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived. History, on 
the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer…History, 
because it is an intellectual and secular production, calls for analysis and criticism. Memory installs 
remembrance within the sacred; history, always prosaic, releases it again. Memory is blind to all but the 
group it binds-which is to say, as Maurice Halbwachs has said, that there are as many memories as there 
are groups, that memory is by nature multiple and yet specific; collective, plural, and yet individual. 
History, on the other hand, belongs to everyone and to no one, whence its claim to universal authority. 
Memory takes root in the concrete, in spaces, gestures, images, and objects; history binds itself strictly to 
temporal continuities, to progressions and to relations between things. Memory is absolute, while history 
can only conceive the relative. (Nora 1989:8-9) 
 
When Nora says that history belongs to everyone and no one in form of physical or electronic 
documents, does the same apply to memories that are recorded, either as a source in a history 
book or as witness testimonial in a documentary? That was just my thought when I recalled that 
Robert Conquests history book of the Holodomor The 
Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine relies heavily on witness 
testimonies recorded by fellow historian James Mace, which of course owes to the 
unavailability of archives at the time. But when does memory seize to be memory and become 
                                                 
19 The famine that occurred in Soviet Ukraine during the early 1920s and during the Nazi occupation are often also 
included together with the Great Famine of 1932-33. A recurring problem, according to Himka (2013), is that 
documentaries such as Harvest of Despair recycle famine images from the 1920s and present them as evidence of 
the Holodomor of 1932-33. In this thesis the main focus is on the “second Holodomor” from 1932-33. 
20 The memory boom refers to the increased focus on memory in academia and society which began in the 1990s. 
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history? Is it when it is placed in the context of a history text and as such is reconstructed therein 
and now belongs to everyone to read and interpret? Nora (1989:9) goes on to say that history is 
“…perpetually suspicious of memory, and its true mission is to suppress and destroy it.” But 
doesn’t history writing often strictly need to rely on social memories, like in the example of 
Conquest and Mace? I would like to add that the dialectical relationship between memory and 
history is important. Memory can enrich and add details and thus update or create disputes and 
debates around published works of history. History could arguably have an impact on personal 
memories by the way of bringing other perspectives to mind. Another good point is that Nora 
and his group were studying cultural memory of monuments, museums, and memorial sites in 
France in a time without Internet (Etkind 2013:176). According to Etkind this meant that they 
overly focused on the sites of historical memory which are “static, self-contained, and 
unconnected” and not too much attention was given to “its temporal dynamics” (Etkind 2013: 
176).  
 
It is hard to discern the relationship between memory and history, but when it comes down to 
the question of who does what in this context, it may look like the barrier between history and 
memory studies can sometimes blend quite fine. An example is historian David Marple’s book 
Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine where he states that 
he is looking at discourses in various texts on the famine. The work is a sort of historiography, 
but at the same time applies a variant of discourse analysis which is more often used in 
sociology or media studies. On the other hand, while discourse analysis is not restricted to one 
discipline, it may be considered a bit unusual for a work of historical inquiry. Perhaps an even 
better example is historian Himka’s article Victim Cinema: Between Hitler and Stalin: Ukraine 
in World War II - The Untold Story where in the beginning of the text he says that “…this article 
explores the collective memory of World War II in the Ukrainian diaspora in North America.” 
(Himka 2008:211) In his article Encumbered Memory: The Ukrainian Famine of 1932–33 
Himka looks at the documentary film Genocide Revealed (Luhovy 2011), maybe also 
unexpected material for historians to study. Himka reviews this documentary about the 
Holodomor alongside textual works in his article Here we can see the use of the word memory 
in the title of the article. By “encumbered memory” Himka probably refers to how the memories 
of both mass killings (Holodomor and the Holocaust) has truly complicated Ukrainian mental 
life and it needs to go through more serious scholarly study and to become free from its 
xenophobic and anti-Semitic traits. Himka’s article may be the only study (to my knowledge) 
that specifically Genocide Revealed. Perhaps just as significant is the point that professor 
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Himka also takes part in the debate on Ukrainian nationalists (OUN – Organization of Ukrainian 
Nationalists) role in the Second World War as well as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) 
collaboration with the Nazis21 (which is a point we shall return to further on). Then we have 
Himka’s own term Victim Cinema, by which he refers to the documentary Genocide Revealed. 
Basically, Himka defines Victim Cinema as a formula used over and over in documentaries on 
the Holodomor which usually involves talking heads intermingled with survivor testimony and 
documentary footage and usually made with a low budget. However, Himka goes on to say that 
Luhovy did make a good job of restoring archival material and that the survivors’ testimonies 
are enlightening, but that the presentation is one-sided and formulaic, and we really learn 
nothing new about the famine that hasn’t been said before. The same applies to the earlier 
documentary Harvest of Despair from 1984 in which Luhovy participated as producer. So, the 
question is: Why produce practically the same film twice? The new documentary really says 
nothing new about the famine that we didn’t learn from the 1983 version. One reply to this 
question could be to look at it in its political context. If we take Harvest of Despair as an 
example, it came to light when the cold war and President Reagans evil empire discourse was 
in use. This was a good opportunity to demonize the Soviet Union in the eyes of the western 
world and to revive Ukrainian nationalism. I imagine one could say: Look, they were starving 
their own people to death and the elderly, women and children were among the victims. An 
interesting aside is that historian Robert Conquest was actually a speechwriter for British prime 
minister Margaret Thatcher, who together with Reagan condemned the Soviet Union for its 
black deeds. However, after the dissolvement of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the independence 
of Ukraine was a fact, attention decreased on the subject of the Holodomor, at least in the West, 
while in Ukraine the Holodomor has been used extensively for nation and identity building. As 
Marples (2007) shows in his book, Ukraine, since independence, needed to write a new national 
history and the Holodomor victimhood has apparently now been lifted to the state narrative 
level and applied for identity building. As we witness the emergence of a new cold war, Ukraine 
is again positioned between empire builders and we now see the production of another 
Holodomor documentary, a production that may prove useful in the ongoing memory wars. It 
seems to be valid for pedagogical purposes as well as there exists a shorter educational version 
to be ordered from the webpage22, but whether it’s been used for this purpose is not known. 
This leads us to some of the intricate obstacles for the Holodomor memory to enter the global 
                                                 
21 See one segment of the video debate series by Uketube (2016) titled ‘OUN, UPA, Jews & Ukrainians: Himka 
Lozynskyj Debate Preview available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fF_U0vRkWwI 
22 The educational version is available at: http://www.genociderevealedmovie.com/product/gr-eng-edu/  
26 
 
genocide discourse. It is worth mentioning the tendency of current Holodomor memory work 
to avoid the issue of collaboration of the OUN with the Nazis during the Holocaust. This may 
perhaps be explained by the fact that the Holodomor preceded the Holocaust in chronology and 
historical works scrutinizing the famine cannot include something which occurred in the future.  
When we are discussing memory work and political memory though, we see that the 
controversial issue of Ukrainian Nazi collaboration is mostly blocked out but is also regularly 
forced into the public light by critical voices, as I will provide examples of later in the analysis. 
 
Regarding iconic visuals, which I focus extensively on in my analysis, I have found that the 
Holodomor of 1932–33 does not provide a lot of photographic material since it was denied to 
such an extent and that Ukraine was pretty much isolated and sealed off from the rest of the 
World. We need to go further back in time and memory to the Russian/Ukrainian famine of 
1921–22 (which did get extensive international attention and aid) to see a bigger amount of 
visual evidence of death by hunger. Our own Norwegian national polar hero Fridjof Nansen 
organized help to the starving populations in Soviet Russia, as did the Red Cross and most 
significantly Herbert Hoover from America.  Millions still did perish during that famine as well, 
but not to the same degree as the Holodomor of 1932–33. So, regarding the first Holodomor, 
sociologist Fuyuki Kurasawa (2012) writes about how the images from 1921–22 famine became 
iconic humanitarian visuals that resonated with an international public and convinced people 
that there actually were millions threatened with death by starvation. Unlike the famine of 
1932–33, this famine at that time was caused by a severe drought combined with the chaotic 
social circumstances after the revolution and subsequent civil war (Kurasawa 2012:67). In 
essence, Kurasawa argues that these images laid the visual foundation for all later humanitarian 
disasters. The images that became iconic were mostly that of starved and sick looking children, 
and arguably the most iconic one is that of a naked tiny and very thin girl leaning against a 
doorframe. Her image was used on a postcard made by the Union internationale de secours aux 
enfants (UISE) were its description read “poor little one.” It was also featured on bulletin boards 
and pamphlets on the famine. Through these mediums she is constructed as a victim, Kurasawa 
says, and the way she is photographed implies her as helpless. Kurasawa then shows how 
British children funds used these images in what may be called sensational to urge people to 
give money for support, much in the same way we see today in humanitarian organizations 
fronting images of starving African children. Kurasawa features a quotation from one David 
Loyd George on the famine who says that it was the most terrible devastation for centuries 
(Kurasawa 2012:68). If we compare this with our current state of humanitarian affairs, we see 
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that what was said back then is basically the same they’re saying in our year of 2018 about the 
looming Yemen famine. Journalist Amanda Erickson at The Washington Post in an article on 
the situation in Yemen, quotes that it has been called “the worst humanitarian catastrophe in 
the world” (Erickson 2017). 
 
For images to become iconic then, they need to be shocking but should also play on our 
empathy. In the case of the Holodomor of 1932-33, the famine victims are not depicted as 
victims of drought and bad harvest coupled with social chaos, but as victims of Soviet state 
terror and of a premediated plan to crush Ukrainian nationalism and the peasantry as a whole. 
What we see in the current political climate in Ukraine is what professor of modern history Jie-
Hyun Lim (2010) terms victimhood nationalism. He talks about the emergence of collective 
suffering and global victimhood where nation states compete about who suffered the most in 
the past. And where there are victims there naturally exists perpetrators. Regarding the 
Jedwabne genocide in Poland, Lim shows how the Laudański brothers,23 who were sentenced 
to prison for the massacre, have gone through a victimhood metamorphosis. He says they have 
gone from being individual victimizers to be embraced under the umbrella of collective Polish 
victimhood (Lim 2010:140–141). This is exactly what seems to be the goal of the Ukrainian 
government, first under Yushchenko (2005 to 2010) and now under Poroshenko (2014 to 
present). Regarding this, lecturer of European studies Eleonora Narvselius, informs us in a very 
detailed account of the contested and conflicting memories in western Ukraine. She tells how 
the Ukrainian government elite under Yushchenko used victimhood for nation building, but just 
as much they apply the strategy of glorification of controversial historical figures like Stephan 
Bandera. Bandera, the wartime-leader of the OUN, has been the nexus around which past and 
recent debates has been circling since the late perestroika period (Narvselius 2012:471). The 
victimhood aspect is based on the claim that Ukraine was suffering on an enormous scale 
between the two totalitarian regimes of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Since the history 
of Ukraine during the Nazi occupation is little known and researched, the dark memories of 
joining the Nazis in the Holocaust is not remembered to the same extent and keeps being buried 
under the acts of remembering the Holodomor and of remembering Bandera as a freedom-
fighter who wanted to construct an independent anti-Soviet Ukraine. Ishchenko (2011) also 
outlines the memory politics of Yuschenko but focuses on civil socio-economic protests in post-
Orange revolution Ukraine (his article is from 2011) at the grass-root level. Ishchenko’s study 
                                                 
23 The Laudański brothers were part of the Polish group of perpetrators of the massacre in the town of Jedwabne 
were 1600 Jews were killed in 1941. 
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is significant because it shows that real problems of the people on the ground is not really cared 
about by politicians, and protests against illegal construction projects or environmental 
problems are mostly organized by local initiatives. The political elite groups instead focus on 
identity politics and the building of museums of the Holodomor and tries to unify the Ukrainian 
people around these historical issues, with lackluster result as the eastern part of Ukraine do not 
share the same view of the Holodomor as the western part. 
 
GLOBAL MEMORIES AND THE HOLOCAUST AS FRAMEWORK FOR SUBALTERN 
GENOCIDES 
The next thing we need to ponder is the term global memory as defined and discussed by 
memory scholar Aleida Assmann. This term is quite relevant when studying depictions of the 
Holodomor. In the chapter The Holocaust – A Global Memory? Extensions and Limits of a New 
Memory Community from the anthology Memory in a Global Age from 2010, Assmann traces 
the stages of the Holocaust went through to become a global memory. First, she asks if there 
can be such a thing as a global or universal memory when the two words contradict each other. 
Globalization and the advent of global communication technologies may be what could make 
memories global.  We learn that similar to the Holodomor, the Holocaust memories were 
repressed for about three decades since the end of the Second World War but is now considered 
the paradigmatic site of memory of Europe, even if it was experienced differently by the its 
many nations. Because of the many national memory constructions, a unified Holocaust 
memory was effectively hindered. Its memory had to be more unified and this happened in the 
year of 1998 when a significant meeting took place in Sweden’s capital Stockholm, and the 
subsequent founding of ITF (The International Task Force on Holocaust Education). This effort 
had the heads of many states collaborate on developing a better Holocaust education. In 2000 
a common framework for commemorating the Holocaust came up for discussion. Thus, a 
universalized education and commemoration practice was important for carrying the memory 
across nation states. This was according to the ITF needed when the communicative memory 
of survivors would eventually fade away. Since then we have seen the building of a great many 
Holocaust museums, monuments, and memorials, which were strong factors in shaping the 
Holocaust as a global memory. Assmann points that just as important as public discourses and 
media representations of an event is the political decisions, organizational networks, and 
funding for creating a long-term national and supranational memory (Assmann 2010:103). 
29 
 
Perhaps most important for this study is how Assmann shows how sociologists Daniel Levy 
and Nathan Sznaider termed the Holocaust a universal, global, and cosmopolitan memory. They 
say that it is the mediatized memories of the Holocaust, like the diary of Anne Frank and TV-
Series like The Holocaust (and I would add Schindler’s List), that has found the most resonance 
with a global public. It is such celluloid monuments as I call such mediatized versions of the 
past that has the strongest power to create global memories or free-floating signifiers as 
Assmann (2010:114) terms them. Next in Assmann’s article, we find another piece of the puzzle 
to understand the Russian and Ukrainian memory sphere. Assmann notes that Russia is not part 
of the ITF and does not commemorate the liberation of Auschwitz in the same way as the EU 
and USA. For Russia that historic moment stands for the end of their victorious Great Patriotic 
War and the defeat of the fascist regime of Hitler, but they won’t include the Jewish suffering 
into their own. It is via the myth of the Great Patriotic War that contemporary Russia draws a 
parallel to the current Ukrainian government, which their national media portray as fascists 
installed through a foreign coup. In this way Russia legitimize their aggressive behavior and 
likens the current crisis as a continuation of the battle against fascism. 
 
But how does the Holocaust memory as a global memory influence other and lesser known 
traumatic memories? Assmann sees the Holocaust memory as a model for other nations to use 
to promote their past suffering and she speaks of these aspects further on in the article: 
 
Through representations such as images, films, books, events and discourses, The Holocaust has spread 
to become a universal symbol with a global resonance. Through the career of its worldwide 
acknowledgement and its status as a super-trauma of maximum prestige, the Holocaust has become the 
para-digm against which other historic traumas are framed. Representations of the Holocaust in museums 
and monuments have become a model and source for the representation of other historical traumas. 
References to the Holocaust are increasingly being used to call attention to other traumas and atrocities. 
(Assmann 2010:114) 
 
I agree with Assmann on these points and I would like to add that we clearly see that new 
museums try to become more visual and now include more screens that can in effect show 
celluloid memories and monuments. The monuments and the museums can go viral so to speak 
in the new digital age. Perhaps the way historical traumas are represented in film may be used 





EXISTING RESEARCH ON HOLODOMOR REPRESENTATIONS IN FILM, MUSEUMS 
AND MONUMENTS – STRATEGIES OF DEMONIZATION 
I will now go through existing literature on museums and memory before looking at literature 
done on specific Holodomor museums and/or monuments and films. 
 
Arnold-de Simine (2012) writes about how intermediality24 becomes more important in the 
memorial landscape. She gives the very fitting example for this study of the The Holocaust 
Museum in Washington D.C, which may be labeled as a “memory museum” or “narrative 
museum”. What signifies such a memory museum? Arnold-de Simine says they do not function 
in the same way as other history museum in that they are not really based upon the museum 
collection, bat rather upon stories or narratives. Instead of basing the museum-narrative on their 
collection, they first write the narrative and then try to fit that in the museum context. Holocaust 
iconography is of course an ingredient in representations in such museums and is used as a 
template for other memory museums to build upon. Arnold-de Simine says that these museums  
 
...define themselves not just as just as sites of academic and institutional history but as spaces of memory, 
exemplifying the shift from the perceived authoritative master dis-course on the past to the paradigm of 
memory which supposedly allows for a wider range of stories about the past – a claim that needs to be 
critically interrogated. (Arnold-de Simine 2012:15) 
 
In this sense these memory museums integrate more personal accounts that is easier for people 
to engage in, and they give room to alternative or untold stories of the past. She goes on to say 
that “…by granting a voice to what has been left out of the dominant discourses of history, 
diverse and some-times even incompatible narratives have supposedly been granted a locus in 
a museal space that claims to aspire no longer any totalizing synthesis, but to a mode of 
representation that has so far been in the domain of art, film and literature.” (Arnold-de Simine 
2012:17) She gives examples of how the The Jewish Museum in Berlin wants to be read as a 
text and of German writer W. G. Sebald’s novel Austerlitz may be thought of as an alternative 
Holocaust museum. Here we can spot a connection to Etkind’s (2013) talking of the literature 
of Solzhenitsyn as an example of textual monuments in the absence of physical monuments of 
Soviet state atrocities. Physical monuments of the Holodomor were absent until the beginning 
                                                 
24 The term intermediality in the context of museums may mean the increased use of different media to represent 




of the 1980s when a monument was erected in Edmonton, Canada in 1983. Before that 
Holodomor memory was mainly found in personal and communicative memory and in various 
Ukrainian/Soviet literature and cinema, as shown by associate professor Iryna Starovoyt (2016) 
in her article ‘Holodomor, Amnesia, and Memory-(Re) Making in Post-War Ukrainian 
Literature and Film’ from 2016. The unveiling of the Edmonton monument happened the same 
year the documentary Harvest of Despair was released, thus forging a double transnational 
monument in that it consisted of a physical monument and a celluloid monument. Such 
transnational monuments have been scrutinized by Swedish historian Per Rudling and I will 
now take a quick look at his article Multiculturalism, Memory, and Ritualization: Ukrainian 
Nationalist Monuments in Edmonton from 2011. This will be complemented with critical 
comments on the same article by professor emeritus of Political science Bohdan Harasymiw, at 
University of Calgary (again a professor with Ukrainian ties in Canada). 
 
Rudling (2011) talks about out how Ukrainian nationalist monuments are dominating the public 
space of the Canadian city of Edmonton. The sites of memory consist of a 1973 monument to 
Ukrainian nationalist leader Roman Shukhevych, a memorial constructed to the Ukrainian 
Waffen-SS war veterans and, most significantly, a memorial to the victims of the 1932–33 
Holodomor. Rudling names this memorial complex (excluding the Holodomor monument) 
“The Shukhevych Complex.” He says that a central purpose of this complex, which he informs 
us was built as a youth complex, was to hinder too great an assimilation of the young into 
Canadian culture. He calls the commemoration practice of the Ukrainian community 
nationalistic. The background for this ethnic community and their monuments in Canada were 
the three waves of immigration by western Ukrainians in the years from 1891 to the 1950s, 
many of them escaping Soviet repression after the famine and the nationalist resistance during 
the Nazi occupation from 1941. Rudling identifies a nationalist narrative via these monuments 
where suffering, resistance, and redemption are keywords. The suffering part which refers to 
the famine is used to counter such claims that Ukrainians are inherently anti-Semitic and were 
represented in the ranks of Hitler’s executioners (Rudling 2011:751). Rudling furthermore 
shows that the number of 7 million dead was used in connection with the monument and that 
of 3 million helpless children starved to death. He then writes that in answer to the unveiling of 
the monument the Soviet Government at that time described it as an attempt by war criminals 
like Waffen-SS veterans to demonize the USSR and its people. He, like professor Himka, also 
notes that the attempt to surpass the 6 million number of the Holocaust does little to increase 




Through its support and funding of Ukrainian nationalist organization, official Cana-dian 
multiculturalism has helped create a culture of social and political acceptance of the nationalist narrative. 
The Ukrainian monuments in Edmonton are no less paradoxical than Waffen-SS veterans as fund raisers 
for genocide awareness: one pledges genocide awareness, another celebrates a mass murderer. This may 
seem schizophrenic, but the two cults are interlinked – the nationalists’ focus on the 1932-33 famine was 
partially a response to allegations about Holocaust perpetrators within the Ukrainian community in North 
America. The initiative for the three monuments analyzed in this article originated with the same groups 
of nationalists. Remarkably, neither the monument to Shukhevych nor the Waffen-SS veterans have been 
scrutinized, debated or questioned. A cynic might add that in this regard official Canadian 
multiculturalism has been successful. Memorials to Hitler’s auxiliaries were built with government 
support, and virtually no opposition, even from the local Polish or Jewish communities. (Rudling:756) 
 
Here we see that much in the same vein as the Laudański brothers are covered under the Polish 
victimhood umbrella, as described by Lim (2010) above, Rudling states that the Ukrainian 
sacred victimhood blots out their own nationalist heroes alleged war crimes against the Jews. 
We should also remember the same Ukrainian nationalist also blamed the Jewish Bolshevism 
for their suffering. This is particularly striking as it looks as if these nationalists with their 
instrumentalization of the Holodomor tries to take the place of the Jewish victims of the 
Holocaust and possibly blames the Jews for Soviets regime of terror and famine.25 
 
Through Rudlings study of diaspora nationalist monuments in Canada, together with fellow 
Swedish historian Johan Dietsch and Himka, we learn of an alleged Ukrainian participation in 
the Jewish Holocaust and other war crimes. Thus, we see that the fascist narrative of Russia has 
its supporters in the West, in this case in the academic field. Later in this text we shall look at 
the fascist narrative in other communication channels.  
 
When blame and the label of fascist is pinned on one group it is often implies that the whole 
group falls under the shadow of this guilt. Harasymiw (2012:295) gives a response to Rudlings 
article in which he points to methodological problems and accusations of ethnic stereotyping. 
He even likens Rudling’s claims to “…someone inferring a Jewish conspiracy to control the 
world from observing that there are Jews in prominent positions somewhere.” Further on he 
                                                 
25 This is not unique to Ukrainian nationalists. Russian nationalist (at least he seems to have transformed into one 
right before his passing) Solzhenitsyn’s very controversial book 200 Years Together from 2002, were he wrote 
about Russian-Jewish relations in the years between 1795 and 1995. In it he claims that many of the people in 
charge of the Soviet state terror were in fact of Jewish origin. For this and certain descriptions of Jewish characters 
he was termed anti-Semitic (Kriza 2014). 
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underlines that terms such as “nationalism”, “Nazi collaborator” and others are not defined and 
are being applied as labels (like in the media narratives of today, where such labels are thrown 
about without any explanation for what they actually mean). He says the historical background 
given is oversimplified and gives a wrong impression. A good point he makes is if you are not 
against the Nazi’s, it automatically implies that you are for them and goes on to state this about 
Rudling’s intentions:  
 
The author’s task in this article is to demonstrate that making heroes of the Ukrains’ka Povstan Armiia 
[Ukrainian Insurgent Army] (OUN-UPA) actually resonates with people of Ukrainian extraction in 
Edmonton 70 years later, unless the real aim is to tar all Ukrainian Canadians, whatever their birthplace 
and personal history, with the same brush, as nationalist–fascist–Nazi collaborators. (Harasymiw 
2012:296) 
 
Here we see how intriguing it is to read two sides of a story. If you only read Rudling’s article 
without any pre-knowledge whatsoever you will think that there is a large fascist nationalist 
element in the Ukrainian Canadian community, while in reality the story might be much more 
complex than all that. Harasymiw characterizes Rudling’s view of Hitler’s Germany and 
Stalin’s Soviet Union as “black and white” and gives examples of why this is so. In the context 
of the Ukrainian community in Canada and fascistic tendencies he notes that 26 000 Ukrainians 
made their way to Canada after the war and that Rudling’s article gives the impression that 
every single one of them were Nazi collaborators (Harasymiw 2012:297). It is clearly blatant 
guilt by association and Harasymiw (2012:297) asks “The real question is, who among the 
public apart from its main purveyors still subscribes today to what the author calls the fascist 
brand of Ukrainian nationalism?” Furthermore, he assesses that Rudling has a very limited 
understanding of Canadian social history and politics and his discussion about multiculturalism 
is misguided and lacking. This, and other similar points are made to deconstruct Rudling’s 
views and claims. The point in reviewing Rudling’s article and Harasymiw’s response lies in 
that they show how such complicated issues and debates is being forced to the fore. Later in the 
analysis we shall see more examples of such “iconoclashing” views and narratives. 
 
SACRALIZATION OF THE HOLODOMOR  
We now move on to existing research specifically related to Holodomor depictions, 
monuments, and museums. Earlier on we already saw how Himka reviewed the documentary 
Genocide Revealed (2011) among other works on the Holodomor, but now we shall see how in 
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the same article he gives a short analysis of the National Museum Holodomor Victims 
Memorial in Kiev, Ukraine. Himka (2013) mainly looks at historical aspects of the works on 
the Holodomor he reviews as he is a historian. Still, his views on the museum may prove useful. 
However, before we look at that we should give some attention to the term genocide, which is 
addresses by Himka. The term originates from Polish-Jewish lawyer Ralph Lemkin. Lemkin 
stated that what happened in Ukraine in that era was a classic example of genocide (Applebaum 
2017: xxvii). Applebaum says that since Lemkin invented the term it has been used in a more 
legalistic manner and become controversial, especially in the case of Ukraine-Russian relations. 
Himka (2013:424) notes how historian Naimark admits the term is problematic for use in 
historical studies but that scholars cannot refrain from taking part in the international discourse 
on genocide. Himka proceeds to ask:” Does not the legal definition of genocide, even if 
amended, reflect an overly simplified view of social action?  (There is a dynamic between 
intention and opportunity, as debates over the origin of the Holocaust, for example, 
demonstrate.)” Himka shows here how difficult it is to apply the term to such a complex event 
as the Holodomor. What’s more is that according to Himka this classifying term genocide may 
induce competition between mass murders and he calls this “victimhood theft”, which is 
something often occurring in victim cinema and is when genocide become competitive (Himka 
2013:425).  An instance of this in found in Genocide Revealed where the narrative says that 
Russia specifically targeted the Ukrainian people through the famine. Russia is portrayed as 
Ukraine’s “Other” and as the perpetrator in this case 
 
Crucial for this study is what Himka calls “the genocide numbers game”. He refers to Naimark 
(who is a professional historian) who gives the estimates of three to five million, while Luhovy 
(who according to Himka is a producer of victim cinema) in the documentary states that 
according to specialist the death toll was from five to twelve million (Himka 2013:426). Himka 
doubts that these “specialist” are specialist in demography as recent studies show number 
ranging from 2.9 to 3.9 millions. The numbers game is a really powerful tool and is used in 
many contemporary cases of tragic mass deaths or to estimate deaths about to happen. Most 
recently I could mention the mall-fire in Kemorov, Russia this year, where the official death 
toll as stated by numerous news channels was about 64, while many unofficial sources (social 
media and the like) started saying that the numbers could be as high as 300-400 and that the 
authorities is trying to cover them up so there will be no international investigation.26 Finally, 
                                                 
26 See an article about this the Russian news outlet Meduza: https://meduza.io/en/cards/they-say-russia-is-trying-
to-cover-up-the-real-death-toll-in-the-kemerovo-fire-is-it-true [Accessed 16.04.2018]. 
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Himka writes that a final deficiency of the genocide term in relation to the Holodomor is that it 
is over- politized and under-intellectualized (Himka 2013:426). He quotes an Ukrainian scholar 
named Heorhii Kas’ianov, who has criticized the politicizing of the famine, on saying that the 
simplistic formula used in disseminating information about the Holodomor (perhaps this could 
refer to webpages on the Internet) is not difficult to understand and has an emotional appeal 
that works well as consumer goods in our “infotainment” society (Himka 2013:426). What 
Himka says next is also important for understanding the memory politics of Ukraine and the 
memorial complex in Kiev. He writes that:  
 
…Kas’ianov sees the Holodomor discourse as having developed into a civil religion. The aesthetics of its 
commemorative practices exhibit “cultic” features closely connected to Christian ritual. An example is 
the campaign, initiated in Ukraine 2006, to light a candle on the day of commemoration of the Holodomor 
every November. President Yushchenko himself appealed to the public to take part in this effort. The 
central structure of the new memorial complex in Kyiv commemorating the Holodomor is a building 
designed to look like a huge candle.  (Himka 2013:427) 
 
Himka further details how the Holodomor commemoration has become sacralized with the 
extensive use of Christian symbols together with Christian burial rites and martyrdom. Because 
of these aspects and that the Holodomor has been so mythicized makes it very hard to study, 
which explains a lot why I have had such a hard time to get to any nuanced understanding of 
the event. Himka (2013:427) also sees a link to the study of the Holocaust: “Sacralization 
polarizes, dichotomizes, tramples nuance, paralyzes questioning”.  The same then may be said 
of the mediatizing of the Holocaust and the Holodomor.  
 
Later in the text Himka gives many examples of xenophobic, Russophobic and anti-Semitic 
aspects of those who promote Holodomor awareness though he does not mean that all who 
work with this share such views. An illuminating example is that of when president Yushchenko 
tried to cement the Holodomor in Ukrainan and global public memory he at the same time 
glorified OUN leaders Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukevych (Himka 2013:430). Another 
very relevant example is how under Yushchenko the Jewish victims usually commemorated at 
the Babi Yar ravine27 close to Kiev were exchanged for the dead OUN members buried there. 
He notes that the same downplaying of the Holocaust is prominent in the Ukrainian diaspora in 
                                                 
27 The Babi Yar ravine was the place were 33 771 victims (Jews prominent among them) were killed during a 




Canada and then gives the names of the biggest funders of Luhovy’s Genocide Revealed, 
William Zuzak and Marco Levytsky. Both are active in defending the OUN leaders from 
alleged participation with the Nazis. Levytsky for example often speaks of how many Jews 
worked in Soviet secret state police (like NKVD). Himka (2013:431) states that: “Of course 
this is the same “Judeo-Bolshevism” argument the OUN itself used to incite and justify violence 
against the Jewish population of western Ukraine”. He then tells of how a Soviet dissident by 
name of Levko Luk’ianenko thinks the Jews guilty for the Holodomor. So, it is not just a 
“victimhood theft” vis-a-vis the Jews, the Ukrainian diaspora and independent Ukraine 
additionally tries to shift blame on to them. This is condemned by Himka as anti-Semitic. These 
same aspects as well as Russo phobic ones is illustrated by Himka with Yuschenko’s Security 
Service of Ukraine’s (SBU) list of perpetrators, which includes many Jewish and Russian 
names, but Ukrainian ones that were partly guilty were not in that list. Anti-Semitism was 
growing during the famine of 1932–33 and reasons for this, Himka argues, were that Jews 
always seemed to have food and held positions in the Torgsin28 stores in major cities in Ukraine 
(Himka 2013:433). At the end of his article Himka (2013:435) concludes that: “The four works 
under review reveal much more about this encumbered memory than about the famine itself.” 
Himka’s article is really helpful in providing a more nuanced look at the complexity of 
Holodomor memory, which is crucial to this study. However, since this study is going to focus 
on the memorial complex in Kiev, partly on its physical monuments and partly on its virtual 
manifestations, Himka’s description of the National Holodomor Museum in Kiev is of some 
importance even though it is brief: 
 
The National Museum Memorial in Commemoration of Famines Victims in Ukraine is a profoundly 
sacralized space. It is situated in the Pechers´k district of Kyiv, not far from the most sacred spot in 
Ukraine, the Kyiv Caves Monastery. The entrance to the memorial museum complex is flanked by two 
angels, keepers of the souls. It seems that the main building, the candlelike structure already mentioned, 
was first conceived literally as a chapel, and many architectural features of that original idea have been 
retained.26 The building has a large cross in front of it. Inside is a symbolic altar. Everyone has the 
opportunity to light a candle in memory of the victims. In this sanctuary of the Holodomor, the Knyhy 
pam˝iati, with their testimonies and martyrologies, play their part. They are placed on lecterns around the 
inner sanctum, like prayer books, a holy scripture. (Himka 2013:428) 
 
                                                 




Himka criticizes the sacred and religious aspects of the complex and thinks that this hinders 
rational inquiry as it replaces it with a myth. Here we can again draw the parallel to my 
theorizing of celluloid monuments were iconic images and feature films establish a type of 
mythical and partly fictional monument which may hinder rational thinking about a subject. An 
example would be if we have seen a filmic representation of what happened during a certain 
period of time (like the Holocaust for example), we then agree it was horrible what happened, 
“they” were total evil people that killed millions of people for no good reason and the good 
guys put an end to it and that is the end of story. Celluloid monuments rarely encourages you 
to question why it happened, what were the actual causes that lead to mass slaughters, they just 
establish that it happened in this way, it was gruesome and anti-human and we must never 
repeat it, even though it is actually still happening right now as I write this in our contemporary 
world. Just take the famines in Africa and Yemen, and the terrible situations in Gaza and Syria. 
Still, the mythical events from the past, especially the Holocaust and their incomprehensible 
horrors somehow dwarfs whatever happens today. 
 
We have now reached another relevant study by media and memory scholar Jessica Rapson 
with the title ‘Babi Yar: Transcultural Memories of Atrocity from Kiev to Denver.’ It is a 
chapter in the anthology Transcultural Turn: Interrogating Memory Between and Beyond 
Borders from 2014. While she mostly focuses on the transculturality of Babi Yar sites of 
memory, the Holodomor and the memorial complex and museum in Kiev is also addressed 
within her study. 
 
As in Himka’s study Rapson (2014) points to the neglect of the Ukrainian state of remembering 
the Holocaust, in this case, the Babi Yar atrocity. Since the mass killing took place at the ravine 
close to Kiev, this site of memory has been ignored by both the Soviet government and the 
Ukrainian since independence and is mainly visible by the absence of memorials. The area has 
apparently been used for dumping garbage and even a hotel was planned to be built on its 
grounds, but the project was abandoned due to protests from the Jewish community (Rapson 
2014:140). She echoes Himka in illustrating how the Holodomor memory is a response to the 
claims of Nazi collaboration and as a vital element in national martyrology. She also gives a 
similar description of the National Holodomor memorial complex and she adds:  
 
The aims of the memorial is, inherent in the designs of the monuments, museum, and UINM publications 
 sold in the small museum shop, are twofold: the provision of an appropriate space in which people may 
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remember and pay tribute to the suffering of holodomor victims; and the integration of the famine years 
as a central co-ordinate in the creation of contemporary Ukrainian national identity…The associated 
museum publications also give a voice to the victims by reproducing their testimonies, which are featured 
in a film projected on the museum’s inner wall at timed intervals. (Rapson 2014:147) 
 
The museum may be seen as an important site of memory for the building of the new national 
Ukrainian identity. Rapson also shows how the demonizing of Stalin as destroyer of the 
Ukrainian nation and architect of the Holodomor is central to this identity. This anti-
Communism is a central element to the nation building which is also aptly illustrated by the de-
communization laws of April 2015.29 Rapson actually suggests that the memorial complex 
needs a more nuanced and expanded analysis since it marks a huge development in Kiev with 
the construction of such a “Westernized” memorial and museum. 
 
We have been through Himka’s professional take on works on the Holodomor and his analysis 
of the Holodomor memorial complex. Rapson has given us a limited analysis of the same 
complex and suggested the need of a broader analysis. However, my task is not just to look at 
the physical elements but to complement this with analysis of the virtual memorial site in the 
vein of Etkind’s theories of hard and soft cultural memory. It is the interaction between these 
two types of memory that forms the core of this study. It has been pointed out that sites of 
memory or monuments do not mean anything by themselves, it is only when they are being 
debated and discussed that they are invested with meaning by the groups that make this effort. 
(REF??) 
 
In the end of this section we need to address research done on famine representations in film. 
Except for Himka’s review article the only other significant study that analyzes depictions of 
the Holodomor in film is done by PhD candidate Iuliia Kysla in the chapter ‘The Ukrainian 
Famine of 1932–1933 on Screen: Making Sense of Suffering.’ This chapter is part of a relevant 
book for those who are interested in lesser known genocides on screen titled The History of 
Genocide in Cinema: Atrocities on Screen from 2016. Kysla looks at the Holodomor in film, 
yet at the same time she includes examples of depictions the Irish Great Famine of the 1840s 
and of course, the Holocaust. It seems that most studies focusing on the Holodomor cannot 
ignore comparisons to the Holocaust. This shows that these events and their latest cinematic 
                                                 
29 See the chapter on memory laws in Ukraine in the book Memory Laws, Memory Wars: The Politics of the Past 
in Europe and Russia (2017) by N. Koposov.  
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representations are closely linked together. Since the Holocaust has gained the status as a global 
or international memory, its “success” in this context is used as a framework for other 
genocides. The films in focus for Kysla are two Ukrainian film: Oles’ Ianchuk’s Holod-33 
(Famine-33) from 1991 and Oles’ Sanin’s Povodyr (The Guide) from 2013. She mentions Bitter 
Harvest by George Medeluk from 2017 by another title The Devil’s Harvest, but it was not yet 
released at her time of writing. Both Holod-33 and Povodyr were produced before the Maidan 
revolution of 2014, while Bitter Harvest came in 2017. It would be interesting to compare the 
two pre-revolution films to Bitter Harvest. The greatest difference of course is that the two 
former films are Ukrainian products while the latest is a western produced film, though strongly 
connected to the diaspora. 
 
Kysla continues with laying out the factors of why there exists so few films depicting famines 
and why it so difficult to visualize such events. Kysla (2016:81) mentions “the limited capacity 
of representation” and asks, “is it possible to describe all the horrors and the scale of such an 
historical phenomenon as famine, and are there any limitations to our ability to understand and 
analyze such a dreadful event?” Then she says that these ethical and visual problems equally 
pertain to the representations of the Holocaust as well and refers to Eli Wiesel. Wiesel is an 
author of books about the Holocaust and gives lectures around the world on the subject. To 
ponder her questions, and I now use her reference to Wiesel as an opportunity to take professor 
of political science Norman G. Finkelstein30 into this discussion, who is an critical opponent of 
Wiesel. In his controversial output The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitations of 
Jewish Suffering, first published in the year of 2000, Finkelstein is critical of Eli Wiesel’s 
arguments and quotes Holocaust memory scholar Peter Novick on this: 
 
Dubbed by Novick the “sacralization of the Holocaust,” this mystification’s most practiced purveyor is 
Eli Wiesel. For Wiesel, Novick rightly observes, The Holocaust is effectively a “mystery” religion. Thus 
Wiesel intones that the Holocaust “leads into darkness,” “negates all answers,” “lies outside, if not beyond 
history,” “defies both knowledge and description,” “cannot be explained nor visual-ized,” is “never to be 
                                                 
30 As an amusing aside, Finkelstein is not very positive about the “analytical category” of memory used by Novick 
in his seminal study The Holocaust in American Life:  
 
Novick’s central category is “memory.” Currently all the rage in the ivory tower, “memory” is surely the most impoverished concept 
to come down the academic pike in a long time. With the obligatory nod to Maurice Halbwachs, Novick aims to demonstrate how 
“current concerns” shape “Holocaust memory.” Once upon a time, dissenting intellectuals deployed robust political categories such 
as “power” and “interests,” on the one hand, and “ideology,” on the other. Today, all that remains is the bland, depoliticized language 
of “concerns” and “memory.” (Finkelstein 2003:5) 
 
Yet, he still approves of Novick’s study and its conclusions. Perhaps the only way to really study the Holocaust is 
to use as obscure a language as possible as not to offend anyone? 
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comprehended or transmitted,” marks a “destruction of history” and a “mutation on a cosmic scale.” Only 
the survivor-priest (read: only Wiesel) is qualified to divine its mystery. (Finkelstein 2003:45) 
 
The reason for taking these mystical aspects of the Holocaust into consideration is the similarity 
to that of the mystification, mythification and sacralization of the Holodomor. These aspects as 
we heard about earlier in this text makes scientific enquiry all the harder as it implies that it 
cannot or should not be understood. The other reason for referring to Finkelstein is his 
introduction of the term “Holocaust Industry” which will prove of some relevance in my 
narrative analysis.  
 
Further on Kysla notes how the reconstructions of such trauma can trivialize it and “making it 
enjoyable for the audience and exploitable for the media” (Kysla 2016:81). These certainly are 
some significant ethic problems such films must struggle with. She adds that we who live after 
the fact of these events and do not face acute hunger cannot fully understand what the victims 
go through. She goes on to show what makes the representation of famine different from the 
Holocaust is the lack of action and the dullness of death by starvation. This is true to some 
extent when you watch films like Schindler’s List where you have the suspense of Nazi soldiers 
raiding the Jewish ghettoes. In that film you had actual people doing all the killing, either by 
shooting or gassing, while in the Holodomor, the famine was invisible, a force of nature that 
killed people slowly. Of course, in the latter case you also had perpetrators, but they only laid 
the groundwork by taking away food, closing borders and making travel from village to cities 
almost impossible. 
 
Next, Kysla notes how Holod-33 differs from Hollywood movies in that it is the opposite of 
such fast-paced and action-filled films. Then she identifies various factors for there being so 
few films tackling the Holodomor: “One has to do with the so-called “Holocaust-mania” and 
lack of international interest, within the cinematographic milieu as well, in other less publicized 
tragedies.” (Kysla 2016:82) On the other hand, the Holocaust memory provides a language of 
universal suffering to be used by other victimized people. She adds the prolonged absence of 
commemoration also played a part, but the same could be said of the Holocaust as noted by A. 
Assmann (2010) and Alexander (2010) and since the early 1990s we have seen the production 




Later, Krysla (like Himka among others) speaks of the “over-politicization” and “sacral 
character” of the Holodomor. According to her this may imply that in the vein of the Holocaust, 
any critique of the Holodomor may come off as an act of denial. One last point she makes 
related to the lack of famine films is Ukraine’s “lack of facilities” to produce large scale movies. 
This seems to be changing with many newly produced Ukrainian films. 
 
In the case of the Narrative in Holod-33 Krysla mentions that it contains anti-Russian rhetoric 
and she identifies this film and Povodyr as part of what she calls “national narrative” 
highlighting the romanticizing of the national Ukrainian past. As Holod-33 is based on the novel 
Yellow Knight (1962) by émigré writer Vasyl’ Barka, also with connections to the Ukrainian 
diaspora it doesn’t give us a wider understanding of the event but re-uses the same discourse 
invented by the Ukrainian diaspora in the 1980s (Kysla 2016:83). This is a significant 
observation made by Krysla. This narrative or discourse created by the diaspora back in the 
1980s does not change but is being reinstated at intervals in time or in “waves” according to the 
shifting political climate. A good point to bear in mind for the analysis of the National 
Holodomor museum. 
 
CELLULOID MONUMENTS AND COUNTER MEMORIALS 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle for the Holodomor to become a universalized trauma is the limited 
archive of visualizations and iconic images and the lack of celluloid monuments of the 
Holodomor. I have taken the term celluloid monument from the title of the book Celluloid War 
Memorials: The British Instructional Films Company and the Memory of the Great War by film 
scholar Michael Connely. In addition to that I build the term on a part of Tonje Sørensens 
doctoral thesis The Second World War in Norwegian film: The topography of Remembrance 
from 2015. In her study she says the following about monuments, commemorations, and film 
that is very relevant for my study:  
 
‘Commemoration’ describes the act of affirming and honouring a particular historical event or person. It 
brings to mind images of monuments surrounded by serious men, with serious faces, laying down wreaths. 
There is a clear ritualistic aspect to commemoration, and it is a ritual that affirms the event or person as 
carrying a particular significance. It is a singling out of a specific point in history, and in this, it is also an 
act of selection. By its very act of choosing one over the other, commemoration implies an idea of value 
and, to some degree, acceptance. What is proposed within this work is that not only stone monuments, 
but also films, can work as acts of commemoration. This chapter will deal specifically with the noticeable 
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fact that the films with the strongest commemorative promotion and reception are usually the ones that 
have an affirmative approach to history. (Sørensen 2015:57) 
 
I see celluloid monuments as films and images that “set in stone” visions of the past and that 
sometimes can replace or distort individual and collective memory. Another way of describing 
it would be like something that constructs a thin mantel, or let’s say “film” over historical texts, 
making them, the celluloid monuments, landmarks for remembering historical events or 
persons. Is it possible that such monuments can take the place of objective historical literature 
and research, that they become a type of hegemonic reference point? Not that this needs to be 
viewed primarily in a negative way as they may provide a starting point for interest in historical 
literature and studies. But when it in any way distorts or simplifies history for political purposes 
it becomes more problematic. Yet we should keep in mind that according to professor 
Alexander Etkind monuments should not, in contrast to the historical museum, be judged by 
rational criteria in contrast to historical museums (Etkind 2013:183).  Furthermore, I derive and 
build my thinking about the celluloid monument in part on professor and memorial expert James 
E. Young theories and his description of monuments and counter-monuments from an interview 
from 1998: 
 
Its [sic] a big rock telling people what to think; its [sic] a big form that pretends to have a meaning, that 
sustains itself for eternity, that never changes over time, never evolves ― it fixes history, it embalms or 
somehow stultifies it. And since totalitarian regimes, like the former Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, 
especially loved monuments, they built whole cultures around monumentality. Which is not to say that 
American democracy hasn't built a culture around monuments, as Greek democracy did. But once the 
monument has been used as the Nazis or Stalin did, it becomes a very suspicious form in the eyes of a 
generation that would like to commemorate the victims of totalitarianism, and are handed the forms of 
totalitarianism to do it. (Young 1998:6) 
 
Youngs way of thinking about monuments will be useful for looking at the Holodomor museum 
in Kiev. Notice that he says monuments fixes history, embalms it, and stultifies it. The same 
may be the case when speaking of celluloid monuments. This embalming of history Young 
talks of can be linked to the mummy complex film expert André Bazin spoke of in his influential 
article The Ontology of the Photographic Image. Further on, Young notes:  
 
For young German artists and architects in particular, there is an essential contradiction here. So they 
have begun to turn to forms which they believe challenge the idea of monumentality, and have arrived at 
something I’d call the “counter-monumental,” or the “counter-memorial” ― the monument that 
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disappears instead of standing for all time; that is built into the ground instead of above it; and that returns 
the burden of memory to those who come looking for it. (Young 1998:7) 
 
Here Young defines counter-monuments as a monument that disappears, that is built into the 
ground instead of above it (this fits in a very literal sense to the National Holodomor museum 
in Kiev as the museum itself is built underground, while on top you have the traditional static 
monuments and sculptures). Still, Young’s counter-monuments are more or less linked to the 
physical world, while my idea of celluloid monuments are liquid, morphing, holds a lot of 
images, moving or still shots, that forms a whole and which forms a statement on the past. An 
example of such a monument would be the feature film Schindler’s List (Spielberg 1993). 
Spielberg’s film is a perfect mix of representation of traumatic memories, accompanying texts 
in forms of subtitles, and fiction. An even better example is the monumental documentary film 
Shoah from 1985 by Claude Lanzmann, which documents many witnesses talking about their 
time in concentration camps. The French philosopher Georges Didi-Huberman (2008:93) 
shows how Lanzmann himself in an interview describes Shoah as a “monument.” This 
statement is in relation to what Lanzmann says about archival footage from the Nazi 
extermination camps, that they cannot evoke thoughts and are without imagination. Thus, as I 
understand it, the work of memory that Lanzmann created with Shoah is, according to himself, 
the sole work that can bring any meaning to what happened during the Holocaust. What Didi-
Huberman says next in regard to Lanzmann’s statements is extremely interesting for this 
memory/history student. In short, Lanzmann states that the event of the Holocaust is 
incomprehensible, and that he would destroy any photographic evidence showing the gassing 
of people in the gas chambers if it should come into his possession and this does not need any 
explanation, it is self-evident why he would destroy them. Didi-Huberman does not agree how 
such evidence, and the examination of it, automatically should equate the refuting of reality, 
and then he says something very important: 
 
The questioning of the image does not only concern visual examination…it requires the constant 
intersection of events, speech and writing. It is difficult to see why working on archives should amount 
to depriving oneself of a “work of development,” quite the contrary: the archive – an often unorganized 
mass at the outset – does not become meaningful unless it is patiently developed. This generally demands 
more time of a historian than it takes a filmmaker to make a film. And why would constructing a 
“monument,” as Lanzmann calls his own work, be equivalent to disqualifying “documents” without 




It is exactly that which is the point: To study the intersection of various documents, be it 
photographic documents, writing or oral documents, so that a fuller picture of what happened 
can emerge. With this in mind, I shall try to demonstrate the term of celluloid monument in 
relation to the film Bitter Harvest (Mendeluk 2017) and look at intertextual references to 
Schindler’s List and the way Holocaust iconicity and narrative is to some degree mimicked by 
this flick. 
 
Another and perhaps the most important inspiration and building block my thinking about 
celluloid monuments is Etkind’s theorizing of hard and soft cultural memory which first 
appeared in the article Hard and Soft in Cultural Memory: Political Mourning in Russia and 
Germany from 2004: 
 
In culture, as in a computer, there are two forms of memory, which might be likened to hardware. Soft 
memory consists primarily of texts (including literary, historical, and other narratives), whereas hard 
memory consists primarily of monuments (and sometimes, state laws and court decisions). Of course, the 
soft and the hard are interdependent. Museums, cemeteries, commemorative festivi-ties, guided tours and 
history textbooks are complicated systems that demonstrate permanent, multilevel interactions between 
the hardware (sculptures, obelisks, memorials, historical places) and the software (guidebooks, directions, 
inscriptions, historical studies) of cultural memory. In memory, monuments without inscriptions are mute, 
whereas texts without monuments are ephemeral. (Etkind 2004: 39-40) 
 
Etkind’s breaking down of cultural memory into two types is useful for this study as it invites 
us to consider the interaction between monuments, museums, and texts. I will keep the main 
focus on visual media like films when considering soft memory. A film could in theory be 
viewed as a textual monument. I would therefore characterize film as a soft variant of cultural 
memory but further theorize it as a celluloid monument or like a visual site of memory. Then 
you may need to ask, can a film be a site of memory? Perhaps not if we view the term site of 
memory like James E. Young does, as strictly a physical historical place grounded in reality? 
Yet on the other hand, a film could contain shots of a physical site of memory or a place that 
resembles such a site, with actors re-enacting history and memories, but that would be more of 
a reconstruction and not the actual historical site, and as such it is detached from physical reality 
and can only be recorded by the camera lens. However, film as a celluloid monument also 
creates a statement about the past to be viewed over and over and with today’s communication 
technology, it has potential to reach audiences all over the world and is not limited to a physical 
visit to the real memory site. If the monument contains written or spoken English text it becomes 
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easier to access and interpret for a global public. Such celluloid monuments become monuments 
of the past, available to all who have the possibility to watch, even if they are fictional 
representations. Considering these global aspects of media memory Etkind (2013:178) writes: 
“Printing and digital technologies have largely de-territorialized cul-tural memory.” He then 
describes modern memory’s temporal units as memory events which he defines as:” …acts of 
revisiting the past that creates ruptures with its established cultural meanings.” I would certainly 
argue that in the context of the Holodomor event, its depictions in film, literature, monuments, 
and museums would qualify as memory events. For example, when the documentary Harvest 
of Despair was released in 1984, accompanied by a monument in Edmonton, and then the 
release of the memoir Execution by Hunger by Miron Dolot in 1985, surely signalized a rupture 
in the wall of denial of the Holodomor. 
 
In his updated version of the hard and soft memory Etkind speaks of differences between 
historical events and memory events which is that memory events are secondary to historical 
ones, but that sometimes a memory event: 
 
…attains the significance of a historical event, therefore blurring the distinction between the 
two…Memory events unfold in many cultural genres, from funerals, to historical debates, from museum 
openings to court proceedings, from the erection or the destruction of a monument to archival findings, 
films, novels, exhibitions, and websites. Historical events tend to be singular while memory events rarely 
are. They repeat themselves in new, creative but recognizable forms, which circulate in cultural space and 
reverberate in time. Like waves, these events move across cultural space, and they are indeed often carried 
by waves. (Etkind 2013:178, my emphasis) 
 
I would think it highly appropriate to apply Etkind’s term when analyzing the Holodomor 
museum, debates surrounding it, its website, and other interlinked textual monuments. Etkind 
(2013:178-179) indeed goes on to describe memory events as multimedia products and feature:” 
…permanent interaction between “hardware” (sites, monuments, and so forth) and their 
“software” (historical, literary, and other texts).” I take it to mean that he includes films and 
documentaries as well in this context.  
 
A bit like Etkind’s theorizing is that of memory scholar Dagmar Brunow when she in her work 
Remediating Transcultural Memory. Documentary Filmmaking as Archival Intervention from 
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2015 seeks to complicate the uses of the term remediation31 and to conceptualize it within 
memory studies. She (Brunow 2015:45) tells that: “…for memory studies the concepts of 
remediation and premediation prove highly useful in acknowledging the dynamics of cultural 
memory and mediatisation.” She points to how these concepts have been adopted by Astrid Erll 
and fellow memory scholar Ann Rigney and tells that Erll views the term remediation as 
memorable events being represented over and over through different media throughout the 
times. The remediation process, according to Erll (as quoted by Brunow), tends to “solidify 
cultural memory, creating and stabilising certain narratives and icons of the past” Before I 
continue on that trail of thought, let us for a moment look at what cultural sociologists Jeffrey 
C. Alexander and Dominik Bartma´nski says regarding the iconic turn in cultural sociology, 
which is reminiscent of what Brunow and Erll just said: 
 
Contemporary icons occupy a wide range of cultural registers. Conventionally, they are associated with 
visual emblems, from evocative sculptures, paintings, and architectural constructions to sublime scenes 
from nature, yet the sensuous surface effects of contemporary icons actually range more widely, to 
popular songs, quintessential consumer products, brands and logos, celebrities, and perfumes that evoke 
lust. It is because they galvanize narratives that icons are not only aesthetic representations but also 
become full citizens of public discourse. In the iconosphere of society, the meanings of social life take on 
sensual form, whether by sight, hearing, touch, taste, or smell. (Alexander and Bartma´nski 2012:2–3, my 
emphasis) 
 
We saw Erll say that remediation stabilized narratives and icons of the past, while Alexander 
and Bartma´nski saiys that icons galvanizes narratives and becomes a part of “public discourse.” 
All what these authors say about icons and narratives is relevant for understanding how 
narratives and icons are being galvanized or remediated in Holodomor museums and films. 
Brunow (2015:45) notes that for representations of the past to keep their function as sites of 
memories they must be constantly represented in new ways. Next, she says that Bolter and 
Grusin do not consider the dynamics of remediation and that it is crucial to understand the 
concept of premediation, which can show how dominant media in a society provides 
frameworks for marginalized stories: “Transparency and immediacy constructed in memory 
media by multiplying other memory media.” (Brunow 2015:45) The example by Erll which 
Brunow then shows is perfect for my study. The prime example Erll refers to is of Yad Vashem, 
a global online collection of photos, testimonies, and virtual tours of Holocaust memorials.  
                                                 
31 The term and concepts of “remediation” and “premediation” comes from the two authors Jay David Bolter and 




Later on, Brunow (2015:200) speaks of the iconic turn and the increased focus on: “…moving 
archival images as well as photographs not only for the purposes of illustration, but as sources 
in their own right. Examples would be the Holocaust exhibition at the Imperial War Museum 
in London or the relaunched permanent exhibition at Bergen-Belsen.”  I would say that the 
same should be kept in mind when studying the National Holodomor Memorial Museum. 
Brunow points to some very relevant insights by Astrid Erll by bringing her and Bolter and 
Grusin into dialogue. Brunow then highlights other important issues of mediating cultural 
memory: 
 
I have argued for the need to take the mediation of memories into account and to provide a textual analysis 
which is not limited to the representation of content or thematic issues, but which looks at the formal-
aesthetic means employed in specific media texts. The case studies have shown how media is not merely 
a vessel for memory, but actively constructs cultural memory, through aesthetic means such as framing 
and lighting, the use of music or the use of interviews, talking heads and testimonial witnesses. 
(Brunow:194) 
 
This shows the need to look at other aspects of documentaries when you consider the big 
production of documentaries of various kinds, especially on the Second World War. On the 
other side we see an increased production of documentaries focusing on marginalized historical 
events, even including alternative histories. Consider also the remediation and increased 
circulation of such documentaries on YouTube and similar channels. If we look back at 
professor Himka (2013) labeling certain documentaries as “Victim Cinema” we saw that he, as 
Brunow suggested, did in fact study the production quality, identified talking heads, and pointed 
to witness testimonials as giving legitimate weight to the films thesis. It is very useful that a 
professional historian gives his take on such memory work since he has done extensive research 
on relatively unknown history from World War II. This may give us a different perspective of 
what historical documentaries set out to do. Maybe in the future we will see more 
transdisciplinary memory media analyses done by scholars from the field of history? 
 
FROM COMMUNICATIVE MEMORY TO CULTURAL MEMORY OF THE HOLODOMOR 
AND PLURI-MEDIAL CONSTELLATIONS 
During my own meager research and writing process I realized that my own work is actually 
an exercise in memory work itself. At the onset, you sit and read a lot of literature, watch films 
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and reminiscence your own personal memories. Then you start to write, and while you do your 
analysis and inner dialogues you automatically recall memories of what you have read and seen, 
and then try to reorganize it all into a coherent text or narrative. The thing is, how balanced am 
I able to make my own narrative? Ultimately you will have to choose what literature to focus 
on and you will necessarily give more weight to one narrative or view over another. 
 
This leads us into the question of how we remember past events that are increasingly obscured 
by time and old age, but also by different biases, changing political climates and the change 
from one regime to another. In this text, I have tried to analyze reconstructions of traumatic 
events, which happened in a mythical past long before I was born. Then what is it that aids us 
to remember and better understand and relate to such traumatic events such as the Holodomor 
and the Holocaust? One memory that comes to mind is when I first encountered depictions of 
the Holocaust (I had never even heard of the Holodomor back then), which was through my 
teachers in school and through school textbooks and film screenings. The stories were thus 
orally mediated through teachers and in addition through various mediated versions. The 
teachers probably (hopefully) learned about the Holocaust from academic literature, but they 
must to some extent have been influenced by fictional books and movies. What struck me was 
that we were never directed or made aware of scholarly literature on the subject through the 
course of schooling. Even in upper secondary school any mention of quality literature of history 
was more or less absent, instead we used simplified school textbooks.  
 
We can say then, like memory scholars Jan and Aleida Assmann, that memories of the past are 
recreated through text and speech, from person to person. An example could be my grandmother 
telling me about experiences from her hometown during the Second World War, thus directly 
mediating lived memories to me. This is what Jan Assmann terms communicative memory, 
which is passed on orally from one generation to the next. With the passing of the last living 
witnesses of these events, Erll (2012:232) then talks of a shift from communicative memory to 
cultural memory. This takes us to the issue of witnesses of the Holodomor and of the term 
cultural memory. I will start with cultural memory and go on to the connection of Holodomor 
witnesses. Erll (2008) gives an enlightening description of cultural memory and its workings: 
 
Cultural memory is based on communication through media…Cultural memory is constituted by a host 
of different media, operating within various symbolic systems: religious texts, historical painting, 
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historiography, TV documentaries, monuments, and commemorative rituals, for example. Each of these 
media has its specific way of remembering and will leave its trace on the memory it creates…Fictional 
media, such as novels and feature films, are characterized by their power to shape the collective 
imagination of the past in a way that is truly fascinating for the literary scholar (and somewhat alarming 
for the historian). (Erll 2010:389) 
 
This applies to my study of documentaries, monuments and film and its impact on “the 
collective imagination” as Erll terms it. But whose collective imagination are we talking of in 
this case? Does there exist a notion of something like a global collective imagination? To 
answer that we may first have to look closer at the terms collective and cultural memory. In the 
book The Transcultural Turn: Interrogating Memory Between and Beyond Borders from 2014, 
Peter Carrier and Kobi Kabalek speaks of these terms and presents criticism of current memory 
studies and its many terms. In their conceptual analysis they describe four assumptions 
regarding memory studies (Carrier and Kabalek 2014:40). An interesting criticism is that the 
focus on “collective memory” in sociologists Jeffrey Olick’s terminology is that it:” 
…sometimes causes scholars to treat literary texts, monuments, or rituals as “memories” instead 
of seeing them as articulations of a mediation between humans and “cultural tools.”” (Carrier 
and Kabalek 2014:41). Further on they refer to Olick’s criticism of some studies talking of 
memory as a “thing” but that instead it should be viewed as things we do or perhaps “acts” is a 
better word. Through this thinking we should not think of museums or similar institutions as 
storehouses of memory, but something that helps us remember, something that triggers 
memories in each individual person. The same could then be said about movies. They are not 
perfect replicates of the past, but they trigger memories, but they could also in their visual 
intensity replace real memories or at least “color” them, as noted by memory scholar Marita 
Sturken: 
 
Cultural memory as a term, implies not only that memories are often produced and reproduced through 
cultural forms, but also the kind of circulation that exists between personal memories and cultural 
memories – the personal photograph for instance, that ends up in the public arena, or the Hollywood film 
that ‘becomes’ part of an individual’s memory of an event. Thus, the personal photographs that are left at 
the Vietnam Veterans Memorial end up in a government archive or in coffee table books and, at the same 
time, the integration of film narratives into personal memories makes it difficult for survivors of historical 





I have tried to reflect in my term celluloid monuments the points made by Sturken. The process 
of consuming films may be linked to a sort of ritualistic mass behavior, or like a celluloid 
commemoration ritual. It is an activity people all over the world engage in, even during working 
hours, in cinemas or directly on their smartphones. This may be viewed as part of a practice of 
engaging yourself in collective memories or being part of the collective imagination. There may 
also be a link to the mass rallies at Nuremberg. This in turn links our fascination with the 
celluloid monuments on the screen with fascism and pagan rituals that Young (2016) talks of. 
 
How then is do the theories of communicative and cultural memory apply to Holodomor 
memories? The horrific event itself happened about 84 years ago. Few people that witnessed 
and survived the famine are still alive today and they will not be able to share their stories with 
us forever. This indicates that the communicative memory of the Holodomor is in the process 
of fading into oblivion and that we from that point on can only depend on the cultural memory 
and mediated memories whether documented via film or orally in an educational setting. Since 
cultural memory partly relies on technologies of memory, like visual or literary media, this in 
turn means that such media may play an important role in shaping the perception of the 
Holodomor in the West and globally. Erll (2012:232) says that: “Over the past three decades or 
so, film seems to have become the leading medium of collective memory. Together with 
ubiquitous new formats of TV, movies about the past – often war films – have increasingly 
become the first, and possibly the most intensive, contact that people in Europe have with their 
history.” She traces this development back to American television series such as Holocaust 
(Chomsky 1978) and blockbuster films like Schindler’s List (Spielberg 1993) and states that: 
“Cinema plays a key role in the narrativization and iconization of war experience.” (Erll 
2012:232) She then refers to something called “basic narratives,” which often are mythical in 
character and they:” …contain versions of national identity, shared values and norms. Memory 
is, of course, highly dynamic and counter-narratives, transformations and revisions of narratives 
are – at least in democratic societies – the rule and not the exception.” (Erll 2012:233).  Thus, 
it becomes increasingly relevant to study filmic representations of the past and this should be 
supplemented with their interplay with monuments and museums, this because new museums 
become more multimodal and available online than before. It is equally important to study the 
factors, and here we go more into detail of memory studies, which help create powerful media 
of memory, which Erll (2008) outlines in her article ‘Literature, Film, and the Mediality of 




…their intra-medial “rhetoric of collective memory”; secondly at their inter-medial dynamics, that is, the 
interplay with earlier and later representations; and thirdly at the pluri-medial contexts in which memory-
making novels and films appear and exert their influence. In short, I am concerned here with phenomena 
within, between, and around those media which have the power to produce and shape cultural memory. 
(Erll 2008:390) 
 
The intra-medial aspects and the “rhetoric of collective memory” she divides into four “modes 
of remembering,” which are all highly useful for studying the cultural and collective memory 
of the Holodomor in films and memorials. The modes are termed as the experiential mode 
(closely connected to communicative memory), the mythical, the antagonistic and the reflexive 
mode. Erll mostly gives literary examples for the experiential mode and refers to “life writing” 
as a good example. This mode of remembering can very well be applied for studying texts, 
films and oral histories that flourish within the National Holodomor Memorial in Kiev and 
narratives in films. The mythical mode also seems great for studying the films of the 
Holodomor. Of this mode she gives an example of how German soldier are turned into mythical 
figures in novels of the First World War and how the historical event of the Vietnam War is 
mythicized in the film Apolcalypse Now by Francis Ford Coppola. The antagonistic mode is 
again something that is relevant for this study as it focuses on how literary forms “maintain one 
version of the past and rejects another.” (Erll 2008:391) The use of negative stereotyping in this 
mode of remembering the past can be used to see how Ukrainian nationalists are portrayed in 
different media, and on the other side, how Russian’s are demonized in Holodomor depictions. 
The reflexive mode gives attention to processes and problems of remembering and is perhaps 
not so helpful to apply for this study, but examples could be historians pointing out problems 
with relying too much on one type of data, for example demographic versus oral histories, to 
reconstruct what happened in the Holodomor. These modes of remembering were part of the 
intra-medial strategy so if we now turn to the inter-medial strategy we will see how links this 
with the terms remediation and premediation. By remediation Erll refers to how historical 
events are being represented through many different media over a long period of time. An event 
that has been turned into a site of memory is not remembered as it happened, but through: “… 
a canon of existent medial constructions, to the narratives and images circulating in a media 
culture.” (Erll 2008:392). These are also “transmedial” according to her and all these factors 
help create a strong site of memory and various techniques in film, like creating a documentary 
feel gives them more authenticity. Premediation is referred to as: “…cultural practices of 
looking, naming, and narrating. It is the effect of and the starting point for mediatized 
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memories.” (Erll 2012:393) And they provide: “…schemata for future experience and its 
representation.” Now we come to perhaps the most relevant tool or prism for looking at 
mediated memories. Erll (2008) terms this the pluri-medial network and pluri-medial 
constellations in another article from 2012. She detailed the strategies that potentially can make 
powerful memories, however: 
 
This potential has to be realized in the process of reception: Novels and movies must be read and viewed 
by a community as media of cultural memory. Films that are not watched or books that are not read may 
provide the most intriguing images of the past, yet they will not have any effect in memory cultures. The 
specific form of reception which turns fictions into memory-making fictions is not an individual, but a 
collective phenomenon. What is needed is a certain kind of context, in which novels and films are prepared 
and received as memory-shaping media. (Erll 2008:395) 
 
She then points to a history boom in the German film industry, but that this boom is certainly 
not limited to Germany. This is true when you look at the Russian and Ukrainian film industry 
where the production of feature films and TV-series about history has seen a upsurge the last 
decade or so. It is thus the reception and network of knowledge production that exists that 
establishes certain films as memory-making media. Especially interesting are Erlls reference to 
controversies within academia. This point takes us deeper into the memory sphere and we shall 
now deal with constructed memories and Jeffrey Alexanders trauma theories, which gives 
another idea of how an audience can relate to a distant event in the past. 
 
TRAUMATIC MEMORIES AS CULTURAL CONSTRUCTS AND THE ICONIC TURN 
In the end of this theoretical chapter I want to briefly look at Jeffrey C. Alexander’s (2004) 
trauma theories to better understand the western view and western cultural memory of the 
Holodomor as it continues to gain more prominence in the western imagination. I believe 
imagination is key in shaping our understanding of past events and I would again like to refer 
to the film Schindler’s List, which is based on the novel Schindler’s Ark by Thomas Keneally 
from 1982, as a good example of how film and literature can shape the collective memory and 
imagination. The film is very illustrative of mediated memories that humanizes the victims of 
the Holocaust and in turn helps us relate to what they are going through. On the other hand, 
there is also the blunt demonization of the Nazis depicted in the film. This film can thus be seen 
as a simplification of history in which there is good on one side and evil on the other or what 
we could call a Manichean black and white view. As such Schindler’s List as a celluloid 
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monument could block out a more nuanced understanding of the Jewish genocide and also may 
overshadow other visual representations of subaltern genocides. If we then peer at this through 
Alexander’s trauma theory, with his terms symbolic extension and psychological identification, 
we see how he argues how the trauma of the Holocaust could be a kind of cultural construct. 
He shows an example of the liberation of the Jews from the concentration camps and following 
reports about the atrocities where the worldwide audience did not immediately connect or 
identify with the victims because of their strange and ghastly appearance after being starved 
and mistreated in the camps. I want to argue that the Holodomor and its victims may seem even 
stranger than the victims of the Holocaust, and even more alien and incomprehensible to a 
western audience due to that it took place in a partially non-existing country at the time (Ukraine 
was engulfed in the Soviet Union during the famine and actually up until 1991) that is so distant 
from our own reality. The difference then may lie in that the Holodomor victims has not been 
humanized to the extent of the Jewish victims in Schindler’s List. There are not many iconic 
celluloid faces that we connect with emotionally from the Holodomor. For we cannot really 
connect with the victims through factual history books or statistics. I can again point to the 
Ukrainian film Holod-33 as one example which gives faces to a family that lives through the 
famine, yet the film is in a foreign language, set in a newly independent country which has not 
cemented itself in the western consciousness. It is slow moving and would mostly resonate with 
the local Ukrainian audience, the diaspora or the special interested.  Another reason for a lack 
of understanding this event could be, like said earlier, the issue of the famine being covered up 
and silenced by the Soviet government for many decades. The lack of knowledge on Ukrainian 
history in the western world (as stated by Solzhenitsyn) especially concerning the famine and 
Ukraine during the Nazi invasion in 1941 and the Holocaust makes it even harder for the event 
to manifest itself in public consciousness. Even knowledge of contemporary Ukraine is pretty 
limited in the western world. But the increase in visual media consumer culture through global 
channels like YouTube or Netflix may change the status of the Holodomor, for better or for 
worse. Intermixed with this, there rages a fierce and mind-bending propaganda/memory/media 
war between Ukraine and Russia with the aim of demonizing the other in the eyes of the West. 
It is a war of values, myths, and beliefs on the political level, as it always has been. A war 
between competing elites for power and wealth and using the people as instruments in this 
battle, as seen in the Maidan Revolution. This war is being waged on the Internet, television or 
through laws on the legislative level (Koposov 2017) and on regional levels in Ukraine through 
symbolic violence against monuments as shown by Plohkii (2017) where more than 500 Lenin 
monuments were removed during the years 2013 and 2014. Plokhy explains that memory wars 
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have been ongoing in Ukraine since the Orange Revolution of 2004 and identifies two 
conflicting narratives employed. One narrative belongs in the category of post-Soviet and the 
other is ethnonational, anti-communist and with anti-Russian elements (Plokhy 2017). The 
identification of these two conflicting narratives is useful when we now proceed to the narrative 
analysis of this study. 
 
Chapter 3 CELLULOID HOLODOMOR MONUMENTS 
As we saw above, global streaming services such as YouTube is an important platform to 
reinstate older documentaries to the current canon of visual debates on historical topics. Such 
recycling of older documentaries (such as Harvest of Despair) on a controversial topic in the 
present digital sphere could be called memory events (Etkind’s term). We have learned that 
Russia does not agree that the Holodomor should be classified as genocide against the Ukrainian 
people, but rather insists that (in the vein of Solzhenitsyn) Russians together with other 
subaltern nationalities in the Soviet Union were mowed down by the famine as well, and that 
there were in fact Ukrainians among the perpetrators. If you visit YouTube, you can easily find 
and watch the full-length version of the Holodomor documentary Harvest of Despair and then 
find related videos in an instant. Does the re-instatement of that documentary in YouTube canon 
creature an established celluloid monument that reflects a nationalistic biased view of the event? 
I think we need to have a look at the narrative told in the documentary to see if that is the case. 
As such, Harvest of Despair provides a lens for looking at newer Holodomor narratives since 
2014 and onwards. 
 
HARVEST OF DESPAIR AND ICONIC VISUALS FROM THE 1921-22 FAMINE 
As shown earlier Harvest of Despair is defined as victim cinema by Himka (2013) and is 
constructed as a slideshow of horrors of the Stalin era interspersed with survivor testimonies 
and “talking heads.” The problem is that the visually entrenched genre as the documentary film 
necessarily needs to rely on archival footage. Such footage, as noted by Brunow, is often viewed 
as sources in themselves and gives an aura of authenticity to the claims made in the film. As 
noted before, such footage or iconic images barely exists from the 1932-33 Holodomor due to 
the Ukraine being closed off and foreign correspondents were usually shown the nicer parts of 
the country. To witness the famine unfolding foreigners needed to sneak off on their own and 
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manage to travel to the sealed areas. One example of this is author Arthur Koestler who 
witnessed areas stricken by the famine on his travel to Kharkov in Ukraine and wrote of this in 
the book The God that Failed from 1949, a collection of confessions of disillusioned ex-
communists. Still, some brave souls managed to capture some of the truth on photography and 
smuggle them out, but not a lot and the images were perhaps to “discreet” compared to images 
from the former famine. Therefore, we can witness in Harvest of Despair the re-
contextualization of older footage from the 1921–22 famine, that mainly raged in Soviet Russia. 
This is of course not without a striking effect on the audience as the images had gained the 
iconic status Kurasawa speaks of. Only this time these elder iconic images reappear not in a 
documentary covering that earlier catastrophe, but in a documentary from 1984 dealing with 
the latter Holodomor famine in Soviet Ukraine. These effective images of famished children 
and piles of dead bodies (some of them taken by Nansen, giving them extra weight of 
authenticity) are taken out of their original context and portrayed as proof for the Ukrainian 
Holodomor of 1932–33. Since this documentary is made long after the fact, the famine imagery 
is not used to promote a humanitarian cause, but for shock value and as taken-out of-context 
evidence of the Soviets crimes. If you as audience won’t bother to check where the images (why 
would you if the production looks good?) stem from, you believe that they all belong to the 
same event. 
 
Earlier in this text we saw how Kurasawa argued how the 1921-22 famine became a 
foundational event for future humanitarian catastrophes. The visual aspects stand strongest in 
this regard and is as such a visual benchmark for all subsequent famines and the like. But what 
of the language and terms used in the memory narratives of that event? Was the term “manmade 
famine” in use back then? I have said how the 1932-33 famine lacks in iconic images compared 
to the former famine, but I would like to suggest that the language used in in the contemporary 
media narratives concerning famines resembles the language used in the national Holodomor 
narratve. As a result, perhaps we see the level of iconic imagery set by the 1921-22 Soviet 
famine and the historical and memory narratives of the 1932-33 Holodomor is combined in 
today’s media coverage of contemporary famines. However, the task set by my thesis is not to 
compare historical famines to temporary ones, therefore we should move on to the analysis of 
Holodomor narratives. 
 
Here I would like to bring attention again to the numbers game and how this still is important 
in media and memory narratives found in news, websites, and museums. According to professor 
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of religious studies Oren Baruch Stier (2016:30) a number can become iconic, like in the case 
of the six million of the Holocaust. He says that such numbers try to appear as a scientific 
counting but usually drives from politics and bureaucracy. Take for instance the figure the 
official Ukrainian state narrative still today reproduces, which gives the number “seven to ten 
million” dead in the 1932-33 Holodomor. In this case it seems like the national state narrative 
has adopted the narrative from Harvest of Despair and not that of recent historical demographic 
research, as pointed out by Himka. This may be evidence of what Himka termed “competitive 
victimhood”. This figure is the same the former Yushchenko administration’s narrative stated 
and apparently, the current Ukrainian government headed by Petro Poroshenko does the same, 
while the latest academic research goes as “low” as 3.5 million.32 This illustrates the existence 
of different levels of the Holodomor narrative and that they are not in sync. We then have 
identified one as the state political narrative and the other as the historical/academic narrative, 
just like Himka and Plokhy gave examples of. We can go further and define the state narrative 
as a type of elite political narrative that is aimed at the Ukrainian public and the international 
community with the goal of acknowledging the Holodomor as a unique event, a genocide, 
ultimately as the ethnic cleansing of Ukrainian people. Then on the other side we have an 
academic or historical narrative, which perhaps is directed more at scholarly communities 
consisting of scholars, teachers and students interested in the topic than at a public audience at 
large. This narrative varies, as should be expected when different scholars at different times 
pursue the subject. Take for example Conquest (1986) and his work The Harvest of Sorrow: 
Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine; they did not have the access to archives we have 
today and had greater difficulties estimating numbers, still even back then, he arrived at an 
estimate no higher than around 5 million deaths due to the famine. Now, if we raise the question 
of which narrative has the biggest impact on the collective or public memory, we may assume 
that news on the internet or television and mainstream historical films has a larger audience 
than academic literature, where you need to immerse yourself in hundreds of pages instead of 
passively watching images of talking heads. Erll (2008) addressed this issue earlier when stating 
that films or TV documentaries may be the first contact people have with their own history. It 
is then possible to imagine that the former would have the greatest impact on perception of the 
Holodomor.  
 
                                                 
32 See Kulchytsky (2015:106) where he points to these numbers from various sources, ranging from 3-4 million 




Here I would like to look at the feature film Bitter Harvest to study its iconography and to 
identify narratives. Earlier findings while studying the documentary Harvest of Despair will be 
used as a lens for analyzing Bitter Harvest. My initial question is therefore: Which recurring 
iconic and symbolic images are reproduced and how is this historical event re-enacted through 
this new feature film? Released in 2017 the film Bitter Harvest was produced in Canada and 
directed by Canadian George Mendeluk. According to the films homepage Ian Ihnatowycz from 
Toronto helped finance the project.33 It is worth noting that filming also took place on locations 
in Ukraine, which makes it a transnational memory work in that Canadians and Ukrainians 
collaborated in this collective act of remembering the Holodomor. English is the main spoken 
language in the film though there are a few occasions where Russian is spoken, which is a point 
we will return to later in the analysis when considering aspects of “othering” and the 
antagonistic mode of remembering. I initially wanted to analyze this film because it was 
produced in the West and may give us a western outlook on the famine and the genocide 
question. While it’s true that it was produced in Canada there are certain complications 
concerning the background of said producers. 
 
Kuhn (2010:307) notes that “communities of remembering” could be grounded in ethnicity and 
shows an example of a Japanese photographic archive from the Second World War. How then 
could the producers of Bitter Harvest be said to ground their memory work of the Holodomor 
in ethnicity? I have already pointed out the partly transnational character of the film. Could it 
be stated that this movie fits in a Canadian-Ukrainian community of remembering by the fact 
that many of the producers have family ties to Ukraine? The family ties to Ukraine of the 
producers shows us that this was not a film produced by an unbiased group of people, but by 
people connected with the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. On the films webpage we can read 
about the background of the producers. Director Mendeluk’s mother had survived the famine 
before fleeing to Germany and then to Canada and the producer and financier Ian Ihnatowyczs 
family also had escaped Ukraine in the 1940s. Screenplay writer Richard Bachynsky‑Hoover 
also has ties to Ukraine and after visiting Ukraine he became obsessed with telling the tale of 
the Holodomor. Then he was offered to write the script for Bitter Harvest. While they all are 
citizens of Canada their background could in some way color the vision of the film (and I guess 
that is unavoidable). They would never agree with the Russian agenda towards Ukraine. But if 




we now focus on the narrative of Bitter Harvest we can better identify if it belongs to the 
national/diaspora version or the historical version. To map the narrative and iconic images, we 
can start at the beginning of the film and then slowly but surely progress through the most 
significant parts. 
 
I want to start with pointing to the end-credits of the film as they state that while it is based on 
a true historical event certain characters (I guess that would entail most of the characters, expect 
Stalin and other historical figures) and incidents have been invented or fictionalized. If we start 
at the very start of the film, we are shown images of the vast wheat fields of Ukraine assumingly 
set in pre-revolutionary times as the narrator (the voice of the main character Yuri Kachaniuk) 
talks of his childhood and the Ukrainian people’s hopes for the future (see figure 5). As we 
mostly follow the events in the film through Yuri’s eyes, this could perhaps be characterized as 
what Erll terms the experiential mode. She mentioned “life writing” and I guess memoirs fall 
under this category. It is as if we experience the memories of Yuri, some from his childhood 
and then the rest from adulthood where he lived through a terrible time. I see a possible links 
in this film to Dolot’s memoir Execution by Hunger where he tells stories from his childhood 
and how he saw what happened in his local village during the famine. Consider the beginning 
of first chapter of Dolot’s book: 
 
I GREW UP in a typical Ukrainian village, in the county of Cherkasy, some hundred miles south of Kiev, 
the capital city of Ukraine. My village stood on the north bank of the Tiasmyn River, one of the many 
tributaries of the Dnipro (Dnieper) River, and it was beautiful. Green hills rose in the south behind the 
river, and the rich tar-black soil of the plains stretched to the north. The plains were divided into strips of 
fields. Every spring and summer these strips would disappear beneath miles of wheat. Waves of rich 
grain, green in spring and golden in summer, gently rolled in the summer breeze. After the harvest, the 
fields again bared their soil as if in mourning for their lost beauty. Near the end of the year, the new cycle 
of color—winter’s white— blended with the horizon of the plains into the gray-blue frosty sky. (Dolot 
1985:1)  
 
The beginning of Bitter Harvest also describes the aesthetics of Yuri’s Ukraine and his village, 
not so much in words but through images of the fields and village structure.  Dolot’s book could 
be thought of as part of the inter-medial dynamics in the Holodomor monument complex. It is 
a certain interplay between the film and earlier representations. In Erll’s conception of 
premediation these earlier representations provide schemes for future depictions. 
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The many stunning shots of Ukraine’s vast fields of wheat could signify one of Ukraine’s 
sources of wealth and food, and therefore also the source of conflict and battle for its natural 
resources. One can see that wheat is of high symbolic value for Holodomor depictions and it is 
worth noting that they are often seen in and at monuments of the Holodomor as they are used 
at national commemorations in Ukraine itself and abroad. In the film one can see a large bundle 
of wheat decorated with other wild flowers (see the images from the movie in figure 6 and 7). 
Other iconic imagery that is often used throughout the film is that of Ukrainian folkloristic and 
religious elements, like witches, national embroidery on clothing. These are aspects of the 
mythical mode of remembering.  
 
After the film has ended we are shown a textual narrative overlaying an image of Holodomor 
artwork depicting a mass grave filled with starved human beings. The image resembles the type 
of historical photographs of famine victims found in the documentary Harvest of Despair and 
elsewhere. However, here the celluloid text, or what also could be termed a textual monument 
within the film, is of greatest importance and it part of it reads as follows: 
 
 In 2003, Russia signed a U.N. declaration confirming that the Holodomor had taken the lives of between 
 7 and 10 million innocent people. Today the Holodomor is recognized as one of the great crimes against 
 humanity. 
 
This text is found in the Norwegian/Scandinavian DVD version, but in the German version 
there is more information. The German text renders part of the Joint UN declaration of 2003 
where it states that the Russian Federation has signed and agreed together with many other 
nations that the Soviet Union was responsible for 7 to 10 million deaths during the Holodomor 
of 1932-1933. Then it goes on to tell that 16 nations recognizes it as genocide. I found it a bit 
strange that the text differs between the two versions. However, the German edition fails to tell 
us that Russia does in fact not recognize the Holodomor as a genocide against Ukraine.  
 
Next thing is the numbers of victims. The numbers of 7-10 million needs to be highlighted as 
it falls under the definition of a Ukrainian state/diaspora narrative and is the iconic number of 
the politicized version of the Holodomor. As I mentioned earlier this number does not reflect 
the current research (which gives about 3 million direct deaths in Ukraine), and that is important 
since the line “based on historical events” is fronted on the DVD-cover. What is more important 
is that Bitter Harvest renders the same number as in the narrative of the documentary Harvest 
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of Despair. We also know that both productions are Canadian and includes people connected 
with the diaspora. We can conclude that the diaspora narrative is used again, but this time in a 
feature film. The question which then follows is: In what fashion is this done? Himka (2013) 
and Marples (2007) have shown how the Holodomor is often compared to the Holocaust in its 
terror and scale. Conquest (1986:3) in his time, compared the sealed of area of Ukraine and 
other areas to its east to “one vast Belsen,” referring to one notorious Nazi concentration camp. 
This camp did not have gas chambers, but instead people died of hunger and diseases, making 
it an apt comparison. One year before Conquest, Ukrainian émigré Dolot (1985) living and 
working in the U.S, named the famine a “hidden Holocaust” in his memoir of the famine, similar 
to the narrative in Harvest of Despair. In the case of Bitter Harvest Holocaust similarities lies 
not solely within the iconic numbers game but are actually found in visual similarity and in 
intertextuality. To show this I have created a collection of screenshots from the film found 
below (figure 9). Not all screenshots are linked to Holocaust imagery though and I shall go 
through them one by one starting from the top left. 
 
The first screenshot in the top left shows a painting that Yuri made at the art academy, 
portraying a starved child sitting by what presumably is its dead parent. This invokes 
resemblances to the iconic imagery from the 1921–22 famine that we learned from Kurasawa. 
The film does not show such starved children played by child-actors, only through this artwork 
within the film medium does it allude to them. We do actually not see that many starved people 
in the last phase of starvation in the film, we mainly see them pale-looking and dirty. In one 
scene Yuri observes starving peasants sitting outside begging for food while wandering the 
backstreets of Kiev. He gives them what food he has. Then he sees a little child sitting by his 
mother. The mother is lying dead on the ground and the child embraces her. The child doesn’t 
look starved though, but well-clothed even if dirty. I guess it must actually be a very difficult 
thing to depict in film without actually starving actors for real. To achieve this effect, they 
would perhaps need to resort to CGI effects, which could work if done right. Still, we see heaps 
of people dead of starvation. The similarity to Holocaust depictions can be seen in these cases. 
Particularly with the pile of dead people stocked in the train cars. We also see images of the 
trains bearing the Soviet red star. These images could imply the likeness of the Holocaust and 
the Holodomor in the killings on an industrial scale which helped by the new transport networks 
of railroads. For example, in Schindler’s List the train cars filled with Jews to be transported to 
their death were frequently shown and we were shown mounds of dead people being burned to 
cover up the Nazi crimes. A better example would be the train cars in Shoah or Night and Fog 
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by Alain Resnais from 1955. A very detailed study on such Holocaust icons like the train cars, 
Anne Frank and similar was published in 2015 by Oren Baruch Stier titled Holocaust Icons: 
Symbolizing the Shoah in History and Memory. He focuses on: “…the microlevel, on the 
building blocks of Holocaust remembrance.” (Stier 2015: xiii) His way of looking at these icons 
together with Sturken’s focus on the consumerism is highly relevant when analyzing 
Holodomor filmic representations and the Holodomor museum in Kiev. 
 
In the bottom right corner, we see Yuri talking to a captured Soviet soldier. This particular line 
stands out and is almost a direct reference to Schindler’s List: “If I can save one life, that’s 
enough for me.” Unfortunately, the film Bitter Harvest cannot compare in quality and emotional 
range to Schindler’s List. You never feel the danger Yuri and the other characters are in, the 
acting is at points overly dramatic, and in the end, you just don’t buy into the story. As such it 
does not generate the emotional connection to the victims which was so skillfully done by 
Spielberg. This may prove that representing the diaspora narrative in a fictional film is a real 
challenge, reasons for this is the aforementioned points by for example Himka (2013) and Kysla 
(2016).  Perhaps by getting a director of Spielberg’s caliber, and maybe try toning down the 
diaspora/national narrative could there be created a more worthwhile celluloid monument to the 
Holodomor. 
 
Now, if we look at the second image (top right in figure 9) it shows a scene in a bar after the 
suicide of the character Mykola a friend of main character Yuri, who is assumed to be based on 
a real Ukrainian communist leader who allegedly committed suicide. Kysla (2016) pointed to 
the same instance in the beginning of film Povodyr and commented that suicide was the only 
redeeming option collaborators of the oppressive Soviet regime could choose. Bitter Harvest 
then, follows the same line in this matter. The same goes for the ethnic aspects identified in the 
narrative of the beforementioned bar scene. Throughout the film English is the main spoken 
language, except for a very few scenes where Russian is spoken. The scene shows Yuri and his 
friends mourning their dear dead friend Mykola in a bar where bandurists are playing Ukrainian 
folk music. Seated close by is a group of Soviet agitators who mocks everything Ukrainian and 
the leader suddenly bursts out: “Enough of that Ukrainian folk shit!” Then follows a fight 
between the two groups which ends with Yuri being imprisoned. In this case, the films narrative 
constructs an image of Ukraine’s other. We see that Ukraine’s oppressor speaks Russian and 





To conclude with the analysis of Bitter Harvest I would say that the film fits Etkind’s 
description of a memory event. 
 
Fascistic aspects in the memorial culture of Ukraine 
According to memorial expert James E. Young (2016), monumental and memorial practices 
abounded during Hitler’s Nazi Germany, even if such practices stem from time immemorial, 
and its aesthetics is still applied in contemporary monuments and memorials. As we have seen 
Himka (2013) and Rudling (2011) links the Holodomor commemorations and glorification of 
OUN leaders to fascism and anti-Semitism and Applebaum (2017) has argued that the 
groundwork for the contemporary Ukrainian fascist image used by Russian media was laid by 
author Douglas Tottle, who published the book Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian 
Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard in 1987. To the extent this national version of the 
Holodomor narrative may be called a myth, this mythicized narrative produced in the West by 
Ukrainian-Canadians in 1984 seems to be recycled in a fictional film of 2017 and results in 
heated debates on the Internet between scholars with differing views on the topic. The genocide 
debate of the Holodomor is interlinked with the fascist/Nazi collaboration debate and the former 
forces the latter into public light. We shall now see and analyze some examples of such debates 
occurring on the Internet. Especially with a platform like YouTube, anyone can now view, and 
to some extent, partake in scholarly debates formerly limited to location. The following debates 
do not address the film Bitter Harvest directly but is rather tied indirectly to it via the National 
Holodomor Victims Memorial Complex in Kiev. I would like to argue that this memorial 
complex is functioning as a central node in what may be called the Holodomor monument 
complex, also involving transnational monuments abroad, which fuels and pushes to the fore 
related controversial issues and creates debates on the Internet’s global discursive space. This 
in turn may result in increased attention to the Holodomor and Ukraine, even if this means that 
negative aspects of the past come to the fore. 
 
We can start to say something about the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance and its 
director Volodymyr Viatrovych who’s received negative reactions to his memory work and 
drafting of memory laws in Ukraine. Political commentator Josh Cohen (2016) has accused 
Viatrovych for downplaying Ukrainian Nationalists involvement in the slaughter of Jews and 
Poles in Ukraine during the Nazi occupation that began in 1941. This he claims has been done 
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by whitewashing of historical documents in the newly opened archives in Ukraine, which was 
opened for access by Viatrovych and his team of historians. In a response to Cohen’s article 
political scientist Alexander J. Motyl did an interview with Viatrovych, found in the article 
‘National Memory in Ukraine - What the West Gets Wrong About Liberals and Nationalists’ 
from 2016, which tries to bring a balance to the debate and Cohen’s claims, but I guess it is 
words against words, unless someone makes a real effort to prove the manipulation of 
documents. Through Motyl’s interview we learn that the Institute of National Memory is not 
exactly swimming in money funding and that they reside in an old office building from 1912. I 
want to quote the beginning of the interview as it points to and sheds light on some of the issues 
I study in this thesis: 
 
 “Are you a fascist?” I ask. “And are you an anti-Semite?” 
 
Volodymyr Viatrovych, the 39-year-old director of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, in Kiev, 
whose critics in the West demonize as an apologist of fascism and anti-Semitism, laughs. “Under no 
circumstances! I consider myself an anti-fascist. I value freedom, above all, and have the greatest respect 
for Jews. Indeed, I consider the Jewish struggle for liberation and equality to be a model for Ukrainians.” 
 
“Well,” I continue, “are you a Banderite?” The reference is to the followers of Stepan Bandera, the 
controversial leader of the radical wing of the organized Ukrainian nationalist movement from the mid-
1930s until his murder by a Soviet assassin in 1959. 
 
“That depends on what you mean by ‘Banderite,’” Viatrovych answers. “According to Russian 
propaganda, every nationally conscious Ukrainian is a Banderite. In that case, so am I. If by Banderite 
you mean a supporter of an interwar form of nationalism, then no.” (Motyl 2016) 
 
It is noteworthy that Viatrovych refers to the Jewish liberation as a model for Ukraine since the 
Holodomor narrative imitates aspects of the Holocaust. We also see the reference to the 
contemporary Russian enemy image of the “Banderite” as Viatrovych apparently been labeled.  
In a connected way we see a bleak outlining of Viatrovych and the national memory institute 
by Cohen (2016:1): “Under Viatrovych’s reign, the country could be headed for a new, and 
frightening, era of censorship. Although events of 75 years ago may seem like settled history, 
they are very much a part of the information war raging between Russia and Ukraine (my 
emphasis).” A third party has commented on this debate, as shown in an article on the online 
newspaper Euromaidan Press by Mariya Schur. According to her a Czech historian named 
David Svoboda says that: “…both sides are making incorrect interpretations.” (Schur 2016) 
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Svoboda states that some Ukrainian historian are glorifying the national movement and UPA, 
while Cohen and others are engaged in demonizing them. There seems to be no middle ground 
in these questions. In response to Cohen’s accusations Viatrovych says he does not know what 
Cohen is referring to and that the archives are open to anyone who wants to check for 
falsification. In the end of the article Schur notes:  
 
As for the accusations challenging him and the institute, Volodymyr Vyatrovych says he is not surprised 
when criticism of the “anti-totalitarian laws” comes from Eastern sources, but finds it hard to understand 
Western scholars who now “sound the alarm about alleged threats related to these laws, but remained 
silent in the past when the archives were closed and when historians were persecuted.” (Schur 2016) 
 
This example of debate shows that Ukrainian nation building, and memory work is not only 
criticized by Russia but also by actors in the West. The next debate I want to show examples 
from is not just done through other mediators in written text, but through live video chat on 
Skype. The debaters are historian John-Paul Himka, who we met earlier, and an American 
attorney (and former president of the Ukrainian World Congress) named Askold Lozynskyj. 
We know Himka’s position about the Holodomor, but where does he stand regarding the 
OUN/UPA? He has done historical research on this topic and has found various evidence for 
Nazi collaboration. As for Lozynskyj, who has written many articles in the Kyiv Post (Ukraine’s 
global voice) on many topics, including the Holodomor, does not see the OUN/UPA as anti-
Semitic or fascist. The most interesting and revealing aspects in the debate is the terminology 
used by Lozynskyj. Basically, he begins with talking about the OUN/UPA and his position on 
the subject of Nazi collaboration. Then he moves on to accuse Himka of being sponsored by 
“the Holocaust industry,” seemingly referring to Norman Finkelstein’s book. Next thing he says 
is that Himka is unfortunately a self-loathing Ukrainian and is a hired gun of said industry. He 
admits that he is not familiar with much of Himka’s work, but that since he has not done much 
work on the Holocaust should not be trusted as an authority on the topic. This is quite some 
interesting language being directed at Himka. Usually one can hear the phrase “self-hating Jew” 
being pinned to Jews who is critical of Israel’s policy (like Finkelstein) or of the Holocaust 
industry, but here we see it being turned around and used by someone who is advocating alleged 
war criminals. I must note that it is quite rare to see such terms being used in this context.  
 
All these examples of debates show that history and memory is constantly used in the 
information war and that this war is not just waged through mediums like Facebook, television 
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or in news discourse, but also through constant revisionism in historical works, through the 
destruction of Soviet monuments in Ukraine, complemented with the building of the National 
Holodomor Memorial and production of celluloid monuments like Bitter Harvest. This last 




Chapter 4 MONUMENTAL MANIFESTATIONS OF THE 
HOLODOMOR IN THE WEST AND IN UKRAINE 
In this chapter I will analyze transnational Holodomor monuments in Canada and the U.S but 
the greatest focus will be dedicated to the Holodomor memorial complex in Kiev. During my 
research on Holodomor monuments and memorials I discovered that the Ukrainian Institute of 
National Memory had requested a database of all Holodomor monuments in Ukraine.34 The 
finished database consists of a map of Ukraine with images of the monuments of all the memory 
sites. Most of the monuments are small and often paid and erected by the local communities. 
However, what I am most interested in is the ones funded by the Ukrainian state and the 
Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, this since its memory work is bound to have greater 
impact on the global collective imagination via the globalized image flow that speeds along the 
Internet information highway and the mediated memory sphere.  
 
Regarding monuments in the West (most of which are found in Canada) there exists a detailed 
list on Wikipedia.35 I hope to fill in some gaps and more details with the analysis and mapping 
of the Holodomor monument complex. We can begin with mentioning the new physical 
monument and memorial that was erected in 2015 in Washington D.C. It shows that it is not 
only in Canada that has a significant Ukrainian diaspora, but one exists in the U.S. as well. The 
fact that George W. Bush did take time to attend a Holodomor commemoration in Kiev shows 
that Ukraine has other strong allies in North America in the memory war. Though if we look 
more closely we see that this picture is more nuanced than the whole of the West being on 
Ukraine’s side against the Russian Federation. Russia has its apologists as well in North 
America, which was very much the case during the famine of 1932–33, the prime example 
being New York Times foreign correspondent in Moscow, Walter Duranty, who denied that a 
large-scale famine took place in Ukraine (Conquest 1986; Applebaum 2017). In the Washington 
monument we see a large rectangular form portraying a field of wheat made of bronze. The 
wheat and grain symbolism are a recurring theme in Holodomor monuments and narratives. In 
large letters under the bronze wheat we can read “Holodomor 1932–33.” To the side of that we 
see a plaque with a memorial text: “Famine-genocide in Ukraine. In memory of the millions of 
innocent victims of a man-made famine in Ukraine engineered and implemented by Stalin’s 
                                                 
34 http://www.holodomor-monuments.org/ See figure 3 for snapshot of the frontpage of the webpage. 
35 See the list at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Holodomor_memorials_and_monuments#Canada  
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totalitarian regime (my emphasis).” I am not sure if the monument is a free-standing monument 
or if its connected to a nearby museum, but if we focus on the monument we see that it is a 
classical physical monument in granite and bronze complemented with a textual monument. 
Just the existence of the monument in Washington D.C. shows that other transnational traumas 
are slowly getting their own place in a Holocaust saturated memory culture. Regarding the 
narrative told by the textual Holodomor monument we see that it reflects the diaspora/national 
narrative in that it calls the famine a definitive genocide engineered and implemented by Stalin 
as main perpetrator. The greatest difference from most other official Holodomor monuments 
lies in a small but very significant detail in this author’s eyes. The plaque shows “the millions 
of innocent victims.” It does not state more specific iconic numbers like that of 7–10 million 
and does therefore not engage in outdoing of the iconic 6 million number of the Holocaust. This 
is probably because it is situated in the homeland of Holocaust culture. Still this may show that 
the cultural landscape of the Holocaust is becoming more inclusive and works as a framework 
for other lesser known mass killings. 
 
THE NATIONAL MUSEUM MEMORIAL TO HOLODOMOR VICTIMS 
If we now move overseas and travel to Ukraine, we can find the largest and most detailed 
memorial site of the Holodomor. The memorial complex is beautifully located high on the 
Pechersk hills on the right bank of the river Dnieper in the city of Kiev, Ukraine (see figure 10 
for a bird view of the complex).36 The museums website names it “The National Museum 
Memorial to Holodomor Victims”. This site of memory or memorial space (a better fitting term 
since most deaths due to famine did not occur in the city of Kiev, but in the countryside) will 
receive the greatest focus as it seems to be by far the richest and multimodal museum experience 
for remembering the Holodomor, both in reality and online. You get the impression that a good 
deal of money was spent on this memorial site, both for its physical architecture and for the 
virtual version. Regarding the virtual part of the museum one can take an interactive online 3D-
Tour on the memorials webpage,37 which is quite an extensive experience and forms part of the 
analysis.  If you scroll down below the 3D-museum tour section, you can explore a 3D-version 
of the memorial statute “Bitter Memory of Childhood.” Here we can observe the word bitter 
and memory in the title of the statue, which resembles the title of the film Bitter Harvest, which 
                                                 
36 More information to be found at: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Museum_%22Memorial_to_Holodomor_victims%22  
37  Visit the museums virtual tour at their official website: http://memorialholodomor.org.ua/eng/ 
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in turn reminds us of the titles Harvest of Despair and Harvest of Sorrow. This could perhaps 
reflect the notion of bitterness of Ukraine towards their Soviet/Russian oppressors. The website 
of the memorial itself seems professionally crafted with all pages in Ukrainian, Russian, and 
English, and the staff is multi lingual making it compelling for international tourists. The 
website itself looks in line with our digital times and stores a wealth of information, documents, 
and images of the Holodomor all too be read in English. You can read on the memorials 
webpage that it was a state funded project and that the artistic idea for the complex came from 
the Ukrainian national painter Anatoliy Gaydamaka. If we apply Etkind’s definition of sites of 
mass terror to the memorial in Kiev we see that it fits: “Memorials at the sites of mass terror 
usually consist of two parts, a museum and a monument.” Next, he says more important things 
to keep in mind when analyzing museums, monuments, and texts:  
 
The museum tells the story and displays the material traces of the events. Producing a coherent narrative, 
a museum is available to discursive analysis and rational criticism, like a lecture or a book. In contrast to 
a historical museum, a monument should not be judged by rational criteria. Generating emotional 
responses, monuments are pieces of art, and they do not make truth claims. The typical monument is 
usually a tower, obelisk, or another secular, abstract symbol, visible from all around…Monuments do not 
reproduce historical reality but rather comments upon it, emotionally and judgmentally. (Etkind 
2013:183) 
 
This is all well and good and that is exactly what the many monuments in Kiev does, but what 
if the museum represents a memory narrative instead of a historical? What if the accompanying 
texts that exists in physical engravings at the memorial site and inside the museum part does 
not represent historical research? These questions will be addressed further on in the analysis 
of this memorial site. Now, to continue the description of the site and the analysis let’s start by 
focusing on physical monuments and texts at the site. 
 
ICONIC IMAGES AND MEMORY TEXTS AT THE PHYSICAL MEMORIAL SITE 
On the physical memorial site of nation museum there are many sculptures and monuments, 
some of which are rich in details and ornaments. I will begin with the statue “Bitter Memory of 
Childhood” (figure 3) which was created by Ukrainian artist Petro Drozdovskyi. If we study 
this statue situated in front of the largest structure, “The Candle of Memory”, we see that it 
portrays an unhappy sickly thin girl holding a wreath of grain. She is constructed so that visitors 
can put flowers or real stalks of grains in her hands, which is often done at official 
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commemorations. The structure “The Candle of Memory” (seen behind the girl on figure 3) is 
placed on top of the national museum, which is located underneath its structure. Again, we 
observe the symbolic wreath of wheat only this time physically manifested in a sculpture. There 
are built in lights on the foundation the girl is placed on which illuminates her even in the 
darkness of night, the same goes for the monument Candle of Memory (see figure 1). At official 
commemorations attended by the President of Ukraine himself, you can see apples being placed 
at the feet of the girl as well as the symbolic wreath of wheat. It seems to be customary at the 
commemoration for the President to kneel in front of the girl sculpture and remember the 
victims in silence together with the gathered crowd. Lights are lighted all over the memorial 
grounds and the sacredness and religious aspects of the ceremony is fulfilled by the presence 
of priests. Speaking of the symbolic wheat seen at the complex I must note the importance of 
this as well. Mounds of grain for example, can also be seen inside the museum itself and 
symbolizes the many dead of famine, “25 000 corpses a day.” The circle of 24 millstones 
(symbolizing 24 hours in a day) that forms around the girl statue is also said to represents 25 000 
dead of hunger every day. The aspects of these unbelievable numbers of dead is something you 
can find written many places on the museums website. The iconic number of 7–10 million is 
often repeated within the virtual complex and shows that it does not reflect the most updated 
demographic research. The most gruesome aspects of the Holodomor were the suffering of 
children, which is a central element in the complex and The Bitter Memory of Childhood statue 
represents this side of the story. Part of the story was that children often stalked the fields after 
harvesting to pick up some left-over wheat. The problem was that this was an illegal act seen 
as theft of the states property and you could be sentenced to death or prison from 10 years. This 
sounds quite unbelievable, but it was in fact the law of that time and part of the collectivization 
and de-kulakization process. A three-part video (it is like a virtual museum tour intercepted by 
interviews) about the memorial complex produces by UATV, a Ukrainian online news 
broadcast aimed at an international audience, includes re-enactments of this process.38 Some 
scenes from this re-enactment shows children being shot for this crime and of agents of the state 
taking away food from the peasant’s property, beating them if unwilling to comply (see figures 
15 and 16). The same video states that the statue of the girl has become a symbol of the 
Holodomor. The statue could be said to be an amalgamation of all the iconic images of starving 
children stemming from the famine of 1921–22, where the most iconic pictures are found. The 
national memorials instrumentalization of victimized children may resemble the way the iconic 
                                                 
38 Holodomor, Part 1 Virtual Museum Tour at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZTlnIj8PBRs  
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famine images of 1921–22 were used to get attention from an international audience. This is 
not problematic unless the photographs from the first famine are used in the museum in the 
context of the 1932–33 Holodomor. To my knowledge, only images from the 1932–33 famine 
appear at the physical museums and its website, but it is hard to know because of the abundance 
of images found in the museum. After doing a quick search with the term 1921–22 in the 
website search engine it only returned one article about a conference held on artificial famines 
in those years and 1946–47. But these years are physically engraved in stone on the monument 
the Candle of Memory. All three famine periods are represented on this monument, but the 
museums greatest focus lies the Holodomor of 1932–33 since that famine was directed at the 
Ukrainian people. While there may be no still photographs from the first famine presented as 
proof of the Ukrainian Holodomor there is the issue of celluloid monuments found in the 
museum. The museum is truly a multimodal and intermedial experience and consists not only 
of physical monuments, exhibitions, archives, and literature, but also of videos being projected 
on the walls where documentaries on the Holodomor are being showed. On the webpage you 
can find a list of all films and documentaries made on the Holodomor in Ukrainian and English 
language. Many of the films can be viewed directly on the webpage, but many of the Ukrainian 
ones are not subtitled in English. It is an impressive collection with many obscure films I had 
never heard of. Harvest of Sorrow is of course included here, and another similar documentary 
called Bread Guillotine (2008 Igor Korbyn). I’m not sure if Harvest of Sorrow is shown at the 
museum to visitors, but in the virtual tour video by UATV there are clips from it displayed 
alongside other documentaries (see figure 11). As Harvest of Sorrow shows footage from the 
first famine to authenticate the Holodomor it becomes problematic to display it in a museum 
setting. Unless the museum staff informs its visitors about such issues and makes them aware 
of such historical recontextualization of documentary footage. As the images from Russian 
famine are the most heart rendering depictions of starved children, it makes sense to use them 
as evidence of the evil deeds of the Soviet Union, and it becomes effective for use in the memory 
war if Russia is implicitly connected with the crimes. Further on in the video by UATV images 
from another documentary showing Putin is shown together with documentary footage of 
Stalin, drawing a parallel between the Holodomor and current political affairs (see figure 12).  
In this context, the Holodomor memorial complex in Kiev is at the epicenter of the memory 
and history war being waged, where Ukraine and its Western allies is on one side against Russia 
and its Western allies on the other. What is important to note here is that in this kind of cultural 
warfare, if we may call it that, is between constructed narratives, aimed at an international 
public where the side with the most appealing story wins the publics approval. It is not without 
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reason that so much money is being spent on media in both Russia, Ukraine, and the West. One 
may perhaps view the Russian media as outdated or not up to the standards of the West, but 
nothing could be further from the truth. British journalist Peter Pomerantsev, who worked for 
years inside Russia’s media machinery, details its workings in his book Nothing is True and 
Everything is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia from 2014. He tells how Russia’s 
media has made an art of merging fiction and reality, and how Putin presidency is represented 
like a movie with Putin starring in many different roles, making the audience engaged in the 
narrative it spins. Whether everything told in this book is true or not Russia and its power 
asserted through the screen should not be underestimated in this media war. The same may 
apply to the Holodomor narrative told in the museum and through various filmic depictions. If 
the memorial complex and its museum is more of a memory museum than a historical one, as 
described by Arnold-de Simine and Etkind, then it will give more weight to witness testimonials 
and oral histories than historical research. The museum website addresses this issue on one of 
their pages where the context is an academic conference held at a university in Ukraine titled 
“Problematic Issues of the Holodomor Study in the 21st Century: Figures, Sources, 
Conclusions”. They website writes for example: “The Holodomor research is impossible to 
conduct without eyewitness accounts and oral histories: although the famine took place in 
different regions of the former Ukrainian SSR, their experience of genocide was identical.” 
(National Museum “Holodomor Victims’ Memorial” 2017) The museum thus voices its stance 
on the importance of these alternative sources for writing a complete history of the Holodomor. 
This adds to the confirmation of the museum as a memory museum which allows other voices 
than that of historians to take center stage. The conference included speeches by many scholars 
from a varied range of disciplines who gave their views on the numbers of victims. The 
website’s text disagrees with many of conference participants, especially on the diasporas 
influence and alleged manipulation of numbers. Here is one example from the memorials 
website: 
 
The speech by Oleksandr Hladun (Doctor of economic sciences, Deputy Director of Scientific Work at 
the Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine named 
after Ptukha) was dedicated to the issues of so-called “manipulations” of the number of losses and the 
“politicization” of the Holodomor “due to the influence of the diaspora.” He spoke negatively of the well-
known Canadian attorney, community and political activist Bohdan Onyschuk who established 7 million 
as the number of Holodomor victims. “It is essential that the diaspora stop supporting scholars who 
maintain the number of 7 million victims.” Unfortunately, O. Hladun did not mention the representatives 
of the Ukrainian diaspora from Canada and USA , who have the opposite view of assessing the losses 
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from the Holodomor and which he, selectively, does not consider to be false. It is important to note that 
he contends that those who support the 7 million mark are doing this intentionally to compete with the 
Holocaust numbers, which is absurd. There are numerous testimonies that established the number of 7 
million prior to the Holocaust. Germany’s Consul General in Kharkiv, K. Walter, J.V. Sapsai, Officer of 
the German Embassy’s committee on agricultural affairs Otto Schiller, Dorota Federbush, and many 
others confirm these findings. (National Museum “Holodomor Victims’ Memorial” 2017, original 
emphasis in bold, my emphasis in italics) 
 
It is a bit hard to discern what is the websites own comments and that of the speech holders, but 
here it seems that the museum gives weight to witness testimonies to establish the number of 7 
million number over demographic research. Testimonies are important in establishing what 
happened, but how can they establish how many died during the famine? The demographic 
studies were also done by Ukrainian scholars and the website goes on to questions the intentions 
of the employees of Institute of Demographic research and asks if they are involved in science 
or ideology. The same speech holder from the quote above, Oleksandr Hladun, did praise the 
museum for its national memory work, but raises the same questions to them about the 
manipulation of data. All of this illustrates how embedded in memory work the museum is and 
how strong its connections to the overseas diaspora are. The fact that the museum refers to a 
Canadian attorney and political activist named Bohdan Onyschuk for authenticating the 7 
million number bears a slight connection to the debate between the historian Himka and the 
attorney Lozynskyj. This is because Lozynskyj also believes that this iconic number of the 
Holodomor is the correct estimate.39 The museum has also signed a partnership and shares 
knowledge with the Canadian Museum for Human Rights, and the conference above was 
organized in partnership with Ukrainian Genocide Famine Foundation of the USA. Historian 
Stanislav Kulchytsky was also present at the conference and he too addressed the importance 
of survivor accounts since they confirm the artificial nature of the famine and that Stalin 
supervised the hunger. These accounts tell that not only bread was taken away from households, 
but all types of food were confiscated by government agents. What is most interesting is that 
he mentions Applebaum’s recent work Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine as an example of 
a lack of understanding by foreigners of the criminal aspects of the famine. This sounds 
awkward, but it shows that Applebaum’s work is not intent on proving that the famine was 
genocide at all costs. 
 
                                                 




This connects us to others finding in the analysis, which is the transnational replicas of the 
Bitter Memory of Childhood statute in Canada, of which there are three. Regarding the 
connection, one replica statue is found inside the Canandian Museum for Human Rights, which 
also houses an exhibit about the Holodomor named “Breaking the Silence.” An international 
memorial ritual exists where people light a candle in the memory of the victims every 24th of 
November and was agreed upon by this museum. The next statue is in Winnipeg and is placed 
right next to a statue of the Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko making the site a 
transnational Ukrainian site of memory. The statue in Winnipeg was sponsored by the 
Ukrainian Canadian Congress – Manitoba Provincial Council and was unveiled in 2014 on the 
grounds of the Manitoba Legislative Building. Pictures from the unveiling show that it was a 
deeply sacralized ceremony with blessings made over the monument by a priest from the 
Ukrainian Catholic Archeparchy of Winnipeg. The third statue is also located outside in the 
Wascana Centre which lies in Regina in Canada. The website of the Wascana Centre has a page 
about the statue and the Holodomor.40 It says that the statue was erected in 2015 close to the 
city’s legislative building. The short text on the webpage does mention the term man-made, but 
not that of genocide. The 7 million number is absent, but it states that millions of Ukrainians 
and Cossacks died during this famine. On an image of the statue found on a Wikipedia page 
about Wascana Centre we can spot the term genocide on the memorial plaque close to the statue, 
but not that of the 7 million death toll number. This shows that this iconic number is not 
manifested at all memorial sites of the Holodomor. I still must point out in this context that I 
have not found many such sites that uses the lower numbers from the latest research, if any. It 
is either the general “millions of victims” or “seven to ten million.” 
 
Earlier in the analysis we saw examples from the videos created by UATV, which partly was a 
virtual tour of the Holodomor museum that gives great insight in the essence of the music with 
a lot of beautiful footage of the complex and even re-enactments of memories of the 
Holodomor. The museum itself is very up to date and has potential to reach large audiences on 
the web and I now want to briefly focus on the interactive virtual tour available at the museums 
own website. Everything at this complex is very visual and graphic, with videos being shown 
to visitors, large framed documentary photographs placed around and many monuments and 
texts to read and almost all of this can be experienced through your own computer at home. 
When you first enter the virtual tour, you are shown the inside of the museum complex from 
                                                 
40 http://wascana.ca/things-to-see-and-do/monuments-and-memorials/holodomor-statue  
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above, (the viewing mode is called “Dollhouse”) (see figure 13) and you can pan the view and 
zoom in and out. If you click on the entrance of the museum you are sent there and the view 
switches to first-person (floor plan mode) (see figure 14). You can now move around inside the 
museum, but not freely like a real first-person computer game, but more like the street-view 
mode in Google Maps. All the items in the virtual museum world is clickable and provides a 
link to the museums webpage that covers the items history. Everything is in English, so it is 
accessible for a global public. All in all, this kind of digital memory work this museum engages 
in is quite impressive and you can immerse yourself in a lot of histories from the Holodomor 
event. It certainly looks professionally and skillfully done, just like the virtual video tour 
produced by UATV and it shows that the people who does this work really cares about the 
subject. The museum can be characterized as memory museum for the most part and it certainly 
allows many voices inside within its walls. It has an educational branch were school classes are 
given lectures and survivors are scheduled for appearances and tells their stories from the 
famine.  
 
The last piece up for analysis from the Holodomor memorial museum is a part of their webpage 
that refers to a mapping project called “The Digital Atlas of Holodomor”41, done by scholars of 
the Ukrainian Institute of Harvard University in North America. Serhii Plokhy is one of the 
historians responsible for this project. The museums site has published a site about this with a 
short text with information about the project and the line: “The Maps of Atlas demonstrate and 
prove that Holodomor was organized by the leadership of the Soviet Union.” It provides a link 
to the Harvard site where you are sent to an interactive map of the Holodomor. A text pops up 
in front of this map telling about the demographic losses due to the famine. Here the number 
given is that of the latest academic studies which is 3.9 million direct losses. So at least the 
museum website directs its visitors to sources that do not always comply to the 7 to 10 million 
figure and does as such not exclusively front the national/diaspora narrative, though that seems 
to be the main story focused on. 
 
THE HOLODOMOR COMPLEX IN A GLOBAL AND PLURI-MEDIAL CONTEXT 
After the analysis we can see that the Holodomor memory has increasingly become more global 
and universalized, especially after the opening of the memorial complex in Ukraine. With the 
                                                 
41 http://memorialholodomor.org.ua/eng/holodomor/digital-atlas-of-the-holodomor/  
75 
 
production of videos in the English language, like the virtual tour video by UATV, a global 
audience can get more into the Holodomor story, even if it doesn’t reflect the whole story or 
the latest research. To use Erll’s terminology, I think the museum’s way of displaying and 
narrating the historical event could be characterized as being somewhat in an antagonistic mode 
of remembering, because it too such an great extent employs the national/diaspora narrative and 
that it only includes Soviet/Russian in the list of perpetrators, while people in the Ukrainian 
leadership partook in the crimes.  If we look at the pluri-medial network I think it is safe to say 
that the film Bitter Harvest is certainly debated and talked about, since it is the only film about 
the Holodomor in English language out there. But other elements must also be included to make 
it a “memory-making” film:  
 
Scrutinizing the cultural practices surrounding history movies we determined that it is not in the first place 
the medial and inter-medial strategies that turn a “film about history” into a “memory-making film,” but 
instead what has been established around them: A tight network of other medial representations (and 
medially represented actions) prepare the ground for the movies, lead reception along certain paths, open 
up and channel public discussion, and thus endow films with their memorial meaning. (Erll 2008:395–
396) 
 
 We have seen that both Bitter Harvest and the memorial complex builds on earlier 
representations like Dolot’s Execution by Hunger and the documentary Harvest of Despair and 
it is being remediated via YouTube. There is also an intertextual connection between the titles 
of Bitter Harvest, Harvest of Despair and Harvest of Sorrow. We can say that these 
representations make each other into powerful memory making media and helps solidifying the 
narratives in the global collective imagination. Perhaps we are even witnessing the emergence 
of a “Holodomor Industry” with the transnational network of museums, monuments, and films? 
While all of these are national reconstructions of the past they provide a window into beginning 
to comprehend the event. The digital and modern infrastructure of the National Holodomor 





Chapter 5 CONCLUSION 
Through the analyzes of films, monuments, websites, and online debates we can begin to arrive 
at some preliminary answers on the question we asked earlier. The documentary and feature 
film Bitter Harvest certainly constructs a national Ukrainian narrative and is closely tied to the 
diaspora. Bitter Harvest may become a celluloid monument of the Holodomor and many people 
in the Western world will probably learn about the famine through such depictions. Since this 
celluloid monument screens the iconic number of 7–10 million dead by hunger in the end 
credits, many will maybe believe this to be the correct estimate and perhaps consider this a 
worse crime than the Holocaust but may not be aware that the film uses representations of the 
Jewish genocide as a framework. This is all part of a victimization strategy (as pointed out by 
Ishchenko and Himka). This strategy is also illuminated by the use of iconic images from the 
famine of 1921–22 in the context of the Holodomor of 1932–33. I have found that Bitter Harvest 
is partly in an experiential mode as we see the event mostly through Yuri, the main character 
of the film, recalling the effect of survivors giving testimony of the event. The film seems to be 
antagonistic in that it fronts a nationalistic and ethnic view of the event and by doing that, 
cancels other complexities, namely that the famine also claimed victims from other 
nationalities. It is also antagonistic in that it demonizes people who speak Russian as they are 
depicted as the perpetrators of the crime who uses hunger as a weapon to quell the Ukrainian 
nationalism. These aspects are part of a demonization strategy used by Ukraine’s leadership 
and we have also seen examples of how Russia employs the same strategy. Another thing which 
has been pointed out is the use of the Holocaust memory as a framework. This is found in text, 
titles of works (i.e. “The Forgotten Holocaust”) and for example through visual, intertextual, 
and iconic similarities between Bitter Harvest and Schindler’s List. But on the other hand, we 
have seen how too much focus on the Holocaust in Ukraine casts light on the darker side of the 
nations history, which leads to heated debates online and in academia. In the last part of the 
analysis I have studied various transnational Holodomor monuments located in North America 
(mostly Canada). The monument in Washington D. C. shows that a lesser known atrocity has 
gotten a nation where the Holocaust memory is hegemonic. By analyzing the National 
Holodomor Victims Memorial, I have found that the museum part of the complex is more of a 
“memory museum” than a historical one. Through various examples from its websites and 
virtual tour we see that it relies heavily on witness testimonials and appears to give little room 
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to recent demographic research. The museum is connected to the overseas diaspora and seems 
to incorporate and build on its national narrative, which is the same found in Harvest of Despair 
and Bitter Harvest. The iconic number of 7–10 million dead of starvation is therefore also used 
in the museum, though it has links to other academic projects which shows to the lower number 
of 3.9 million. Via analysis and visual examples from the museums virtual tour we see that the 
museum is connected to the digital information age, allowing a global audience to experience 
it directly from their own homes. This aspect coupled with other interconnected representations 
like films, texts and monuments imbibes it with great potential as “memory making media” and 
we will probably see even more powerful physical and celluloid monuments in the future. 
 
 
To conclude I would like to say that the initial mapping of the Holodomor Monument Complex 
is far from complete. There are many other elements that could be included, but space and time 
restricted this. This study could be extended into a doctoral project where for example other 
new museum projects in Kiev could be included too compare narratives. One example would 
be the memorial museum for the Babi Yar massacre under construction in Kiev. I would like to 
visit the National Holodomor Victims Memorial in the future, and after carrying out this 
analysis of the virtual part of the museum, and reading about the background of the famine, it 
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Figure 3 The statue "Bitter Memory of Childhood" by sculptor Petro Drozdovskyi 
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Figure 6 Decorative and symbolic wheat stalks 
 




Figure 8 Close-up sunflower and bee (symbolic of Ukraine) 
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Figure 14 Virtual tour – Entrance (floor plan view) 
 
 





Figure 16 State agents beating up a villager 
